location, as decreasing in importance. Nevertheless, boundaries continue to play an important role, at least in less developed regions.

Most critical in the modern age has been the role of military power. There is evidence suggesting that force has a deterrent value. But there appears to be little consensus on whether superior force makes peace more likely or less so.

Although economic power has become more important, given increased economic interdependence and the fear of nuclear war, the two major instruments of trade and aid have their limitations. Economic boycotts have generally been ineffective in influencing the behavior of other states, although oil boycotts have had some effect.

Relative power capabilities seem to make some difference in the foreign-policy choices of states. Large states have tended to be more active and to engage in more conflict than small states. The latter prefer multilateral forums to bilateral ones and utilize mediation more often. Alliances appear to be composed largely of powers of unequal size. Coalitions of small states have not been effective, nor has nonalignment been a viable option, unless the small state is willing to withdraw from world politics and to be nonprovocative in its foreign policy.

Power is important in bargaining and negotiation, although the strategy of bargaining from strength has tended to reduce the likelihood of agreement. Positions of power parity have been more conducive to agreement, despite evidence suggesting that under certain circumstances, small states may be able to prevail over large states in a bargaining relationship.

# 8 EXTERNAL AND SYSTEMIC DETERMINANTS

Our discussion so far has focused on factors that are largely internal to the nation-state. The exception has been national power capabilities, which have both an internal and an external component. In this chapter we shall explore the impact of external actors and the structure of the international system on the foreign-policy behavior of a state. In a sense, if there were no external determinants, there would be no foreign policy. In developing a foreign policy, a state is largely reacting to some condition or happening in its external environment. Those who subscribe to the rational-actor model (see Chapter 1) tend to regard this level of analysis as the only significant one.

Much of what is written about international relations is approached from this particular perspective, with little reference to many of the internal calculations already discussed. Despite the extensive use of this approach, there is comparatively little in the way of empirically verifiable work concerning the impact of external variables on foreign policy. The bulk of such research tends to be anecdotal and descriptive. The exception is the recent outpouring of research utilizing what has come to be known as the *event analysis* approach. This approach involves the coding of hundreds of moves, including such activities as threats, promises, protests, violence, and the like, in which states en-

gage on an almost daily basis. These are quantified and analyzed in an attempt to determine changes and directions in the foreign policy of a state. Such data are also useful in examining action–reaction models in foreign policy—an issue to which we now turn our attention.

## ACTION AND REACTION IN WORLD POLITICS

Utilizing event data, a number of researchers have documented the tendency of states to reciprocate both hostile and conciliatory behavior. The author of an analysis of the foreign-policy behavior of seventy-eight countries in the developing world concluded that "the international conflict behavior of third world countries conforms very strongly to a simple stimulus response relationship in which the conflict that countries send to other countries in the region is a function of the conflict received from the region."[1] Another researcher analyzing global conflict behavior during 1963 similarly found that the states that initiated relatively large amounts of conflict also tended to be the targets of considerable conflict, at least when the data were aggregated to the yearly level.[2] The same pattern, however, did not persist when the data were analyzed on a monthly basis, perhaps suggesting that reaction is not always immediate. The exception is military violence, in which there may be little choice but to respond punctually in kind.

Several regional studies have confirmed a certain level of reciprocation in foreign-policy behavior. For example, a study of the 1961 Sino-Indian border conflict found a strong correlation between Chinese and Indian actions in the conflict, and an examination of action and reaction in the Cuban missile crisis also proved to be statistically significant as both the United States and the Soviet Union reciprocated each other's hostile and conciliatory actions.[3] Similar results were found in

1. Stephen G. Walker, "New Nations and an Old Model: The Application of the Garrison State Theory to the Third World," in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., *The Military and Security in the Third World* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1978), p. 180.

2. Warren R. Phillips, "The Dynamics of Behavioral Action and Reaction in International Conflict," *Peace Research Society (International) Papers*, 17 (1970), 31–46.

3. John Osgood Field, "The Sino-Indian Border Conflict: An Exploratory Analysis of Action and Perception," *Sage Professional Papers*, 1 (1972), 47, and Ole R. Holsti, Richard A. Brody, and Robert C. North, "Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models: Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Crisis," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1, nos. 3–4 (1964), 177.



several studies involving the Arab–Israeli conflict, even though different time periods and measuring techniques were utilized.[4] Finally, Dina A. Zinnes found that, with respect to diplomatic messages during the 1914 crisis preceding World War I, there was a high correlation between the perception of hostility and its emission by each state that entered the war.[5]

Charles A. McClelland has noted that states engaged in long periods of acute international crises have a tendency to routinize their behavior. His analyses, drawing on the conflicts over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu and over Berlin, suggest that when one state reacts to the behavior of another over time, some learning goes on that makes subsequent confrontations less dangerous because the states have learned from their handling of past crises.[6] As long as occasional crises do not lead to complacency and lack of adequate caution, McClelland's findings have important implications for the development of a peaceful world as states learn to routinize their conflict behavior without resorting to violence.

Research on cooperative moves also suggests some tendency toward reciprocation. An examination of United States and Soviet concession scores on general disarmament issues during the twenty-one rounds of negotiations that were held in London, New York, and Geneva over the period 1946–60 revealed considerable reciprocation between the two powers. After excluding the erratic year 1955, during which the Soviet Union made numerous concessions and the United States "reserved" all of its past disarmament proposals, the correlation in mutual reciprocation was found to be a statistically significant .57.[7] Similar findings were discovered in coding concession scores for the Nuclear Test Ban talks that began in 1958 and resulted in the Partial

4. Jeffrey S. Milstein, "American and Soviet Influence, Balance of Power, and Arab–Israeli Violence," in Bruce M. Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972), p. 152; James M. McCormick, "Evaluating Models of Crisis Behavior: Some Evidence from the Middle East," *International Studies Quarterly*, 19 (January 1975), 17–45; Jonathan Wilkenfeld et al., "Conflict Interactions in the Middle East, 1949–1967," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 16 (June 1972), 135–54.

5. Dina A. Zinnes, "A Comparison of Hostile Behavior of Decision-Makers in Simulate and Historical Data," *World Politics*, 13 (April 1966), 474–502.

6. Charles A. McClelland, "Decision Opportunity and Political Controversy: The Quemoy Case," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 6 (September 1962), 201–13, and "Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948–1963," in J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 159–86.

7. Lloyd Jensen, "Soviet–American Bargaining Behavior in the Post-War Disarmament Negotiations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 9 (September 1963), 522–41.

Test Ban Treaty in 1963.[8] But in the latter instance, as the two approached agreement on a comprehensive test ban in April 1960 with all but three articles of the treaty agreed upon, the Soviet Union began to express avoidance behavior. Such behavior suggests that states may be able to make numerous concessions while results seem remote, perhaps in the expectation that the other side will never accept them, but begin to show avoidance tendencies and may even begin to make retractions as agreement is approached. This setback ultimately led to the conclusion of a partial test ban treaty instead of the desired comprehensive one.

A more detailed content analysis of the debates on the test ban treaty, coding attitudes, behaviors, and responses, revealed similar tendencies toward reciprocation, particularly on the part of the United States. The study also suggested that insofar as external conflict did have an effect, the direction was one in which increased cooperation outside the negotiations contributed to more positive internal interaction. Extensive external conflict was found to have a negative effect on the negotiations.[9] Nevertheless, the results indicated that the negotiations were affected more by the behavior taking place within the negotiations than by the external conflict and cooperative behavior engaged in by the participants.

The importance of reciprocation in resolving international differences is also shown in a study of twenty serious disputes that occurred in the twentieth century. The authors found that a reciprocating strategy was the most effective means of avoiding a diplomatic defeat without going to war, especially when such a strategy was employed against a bullying opponent. They suggested that the success of this strategy was related to its face-saving properties as well as "the universal norm of reciprocity in international affairs."[10] A global cross-national study involving conflict and cooperative behavior during the period 1966–69 concluded that states interact on an exchange basis and are responsive to actors that pay attention to them.[11]

8. Lloyd Jensen, "Approach-Avoidance Bargaining in the Test Ban Negotiations," *International Studies Quarterly*, 12 (June 1968), 152–60.

9. P. Terrence Hopmann, "Internal and External Influences on Bargaining in Arms Control Negotiations: The Partial Test Ban," in Russett, *Peace, War, and Numbers*, pp. 313–37.

10. Russell J. Leng and Hugh G. Wheeler, "Influence Strategies, Success, and War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 23 (December 1979), 655–84.

11. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "Selective Attention: A General Characteristic of the Interactive Behavior of Nations," *International Interactions*, 2 (May 1976), 113–16.



Recognizing the importance of concessions to agreement, Charles E. Osgood has suggested that each side in an international conflict situation should gradually reduce international tension by making unilateral conciliatory moves, coupled with verbal and tacit requests that others follow suit.[12] For such a strategy to be successful, he believes the parties should have roughly equal power, be in a stalemate or moving away from a range of acceptable solutions, and be confronted with mutually applied pressure to reach an agreement. Several studies have explicitly tested the Osgood notion of graduated unilateral initiatives and have found the theory to be valid. These include two simulations of strategic arms races and an experiment that utilized dyadic games involving the Prisoner's Dilemma.[13] In the latter study, by S. S. Komorita, Osgood's assertion that the unilateral initiative strategy worked best if utilized subsequent to a competitive stalemate was confirmed. Further evidence of the positive effect of unilateral initiatives was uncovered in a study of United States–Soviet behavior in the test ban talks.[14]

Despite the seeming necessity of making concessions if agreement is to be obtained, such concessions are not without their hazards. A propensity to make concessions may be interpreted by the adversary as an indication that a given issue is not particularly important. Moreover, there is the danger that an adversary may misconstrue the move as an indication of weakness, in which case the adversary is likely to demand more.[15] Experimental studies of bargaining conducted by Siegel and Fouraker suggest that one should begin with hard positions rather than conciliatory moves, which tend only to raise the expectations of others.[16] The end result can only be a less advantageous agreement for the state that begins with the softer position.

Some students of negotiation have rejected the concession/convergence model as a major factor in determining the outcome of

12. Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

13. Wayman J. Crow, "A Study of Strategic Doctrines Using the Inter Nation Simulation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 7 (September 1963), 580–89; Mark Pilisuk and Paul Skolnik, "Inducing Trust: A Test of the Osgood Proposal," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 28 (February 1968), 121–33; S. S. Komorita, "Concession-Making and Conflict Resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 17 (December 1973), 745–62.

14. Amitai Etzioni, "The Kennedy Experiment," *Western Political Quarterly*, 20 (June 1967), 361–80.

15. Charles Lockhart, *Bargaining in International Conflicts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 125.

16. Sidney Siegel and L. E. Fouraker, *Bargaining and Group Decision Making* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

negotiations. I. William Zartman, in a study based on interviews conducted with some fifty ambassadorial-level diplomats at the United Nations, concluded that the negotiation process is one of finding an appropriate formula and attempting to implement it. Minimal attention tends to be paid to the number of concessions made by the other side. Instead, concessions are largely symbolic moves made most often toward the end, when agreement is in sight and it is believed that the other side is likely to accept the package being offered.[17] Interviews with participants in the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations in 1967, which resulted in an agreement for substantial tariff reductions, demonstrated that there was minimal awareness of the concessions made by other particpants, as those involved in the negotiations were unable to agree on when breakthroughs occurred or whether concessions were even made.[18] In complex negotiations of this sort, responses seemed to be related to whether or not a state was predisposed toward a liberal trade policy than to the specific behavior of the other negotiators.

Several studies have suggested that the past behavior of a state is sometimes a better predictor of a state's current behavior than the activities of other states in the international system. Whether this is due simply to bureaucratic inertia or to the fact that one feels more comfortable with habitual forms of behavior is uncertain. Still, such research provides some evidence that action–reaction models may not be the most appropriate ones. It appears that such models are more relevant to crisis behavior than to noncrisis behavior. A study of fourteen precrisis events during the period 1966–69, utilizing data from the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) project, revealed that the action–reaction model provided "unbelievably and almost universally poor fits."[19] The past behavior of a state predicted current behavior far more effectively, and although a combination of the two models increased explanatory capability somewhat, the variance explained was limited. The past-behavior model was also found to be superior to the action–reaction model in explaining communication patterns between India and China for the period 1959–64 and also the perceptions and expressions of

17. I. William Zartman, "Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 21 (December 1977), 619–38.

18. Gilbert R. Winham, "Complexity in International Negotiations," in Daniel Druckman, ed., *Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977), pp. 347–66.

19. Dina A. Zinnes, "Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher," *International Studies Quarterly*, 24 (September 1980), 321.



hostility during the 1914 crisis in Europe.[20] Rather than reacting to the moves of the other side, the parties involved in these two conflicts tended to respond largely as they had in the past. Negotiations between the United States and Nasser over the Aswan Dam also revealed that the parties were more responsive to their own past policies than to each other's moves.[21]

It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that all studies that explicitly compare the predictive value of a state's past behavior with that of moves by the other side find the former to have greater explanatory value. A study of Canadian bilateral relations with other states during the period 1957–70 found significantly higher correlations when applying the stimulus–response model. The overall correlation in bilateral conflict behavior with all countries was .57, with bilateral relations with the United States scoring slightly below the average while those with the Soviet Union scored slightly higher than average. Prior Canadian conflict behavior, on the other hand, scored a correlation of only .18. The study also found that 55 percent of the events coded seemed to have had a specific external stimulus.[22]

Action–reaction models have also been popular in analyzing arms races. That the military spending of one state is related to that of its adversaries is suggested by the work of Lewis F. Richardson, who collected considerable data on defense spending during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[23] Although the level of grievance and fatigue also entered into his equations, military spending tended on the whole to be reciprocated during the various periods analyzed.

Efforts to apply Richardson-type arms race models to United States–Soviet military programs have generally been unproductive. Increases in the defense spending of one side seem not to have led to increased spending on the part of the other. As in the case of other action–reaction models, one's own past armament behavior proved to

20. G. Duncan and R. Siverson, "Markov Models for Conflict Analysis: Results from Sino-Indian Relations, 1959–1964," *International Studies Quarterly*, 19 (September 1975), 344–74, and Gordon Hilton, "Expressions of Hostility in Crisis," *Journal of Peace Research*, 8, nos. 3–4 (1971), 249–62.

21. Bertram I. Spector, "A Social-Psychological Model of Position Modification: Aswan," in I. William Zartman, ed., *The 50% Solution* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday/Anchor Press, 1976), pp. 343–71.

22. Don Munton, "Stimulus–Response and Continuity in Canadian Foreign Policy During the Cold War and Détente," in Brian W. Tomlin, ed., *Canadian Foreign Policy: Analysis and Trends* (Toronto: Methuen, 1978).

23. Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Boxwood, 1960).

be a better predictor than that of the other side.[24] Although one study provided some evidence of a positive Soviet reaction to American military spending,[25] Benjamin S. Lambeth has argued that there is little evidence to suggest that Soviet force deployments have in fact been reflex responses to American strategic weapons decisions. As evidence, he cites the fact that the Soviets were talking about maneuverable weapons as early as 1963; Soviet research and development on MIRVs preceded their deployment by the United States; and the Soviets' offensive buildup began in 1962, prior to the United States' decision to establish a strategic posture of 1,054 ICBMs.[26]

Studies of arms races in other parts of the world and in other times have produced divided results. An examination of arms races in the Middle East revealed that for some times and for some states there has been a reciprocal arms buildup. In comparing arms races from 1956 to the 1967 war and from 1967 to the October 1973 war, Hans Rattinger found evidence of an overall arms race only during the first period, whereas in the second period only Israel was seen as reacting to Arab inventories, capabilities, and manpower.[27] The author suggests that one reason for the lack of Arab reaction after 1967 may have been the decision to avenge the 1967 war. In that sense an absence of mutual reciprocation may foreshadow aggression as arms continue to build up, regardless of the behavior of the other side.

A similar study looking at the arms race in Europe during the 1950s and 1960s revealed that reaction processes were significantly more discernible for the NATO nations, especially Britain and France, than for the Warsaw Pact nations.[28] Nevertheless, the author of the study found that bureaucratic momentum had a greater influence on arms spending than action–reaction behavior and international tension.

24. Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., "Evaluating Alternative Foreign Policy Decision-Making Models," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 21 (June 1977), 235–66, and W. Ladd Hollist, "An Analysis of Arms Processes in the United States and the Soviet Union," *International Studies Quarterly*, 21 (September 1977), 503–28.

25. Zivia S. Wurtele, *A Quantitative Analysis of Arms Competition* (Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics, 1976).

26. Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Sources of Soviet Military Doctrine," in Frank B. Horton et al., eds., *Comparative Defense Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1974), pp. 202–3.

27. Hans Rattinger, "From War to War: Arms Races in the Middle East," *International Studies Quarterly*, 20 (December 1976), 501–31.

28. Hans Rattinger, "Armaments, Détente, and Bureaucracy: The Case of the Arms Race in Europe," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 19 (December 1975), 571–95.



Earlier evidence of arms races is seen in the 1905–16 Anglo-German naval race, in which the British demonstrated a greater propensity to react than the Germans.[29] The two parties also differed in emphasis, with Germany stressing the qualitative race while Britain seemed more concerned with the quantitative race.

There are several reasons why the action–reaction model of arms races is not always descriptive of what happens in the real world, not the least of which are domestic political and bureaucratic factors. Arms expenditures may be explained largely by pressures emanating from the military–industrial complex, as discussed in Chapter 6. Such expenditures may also be motivated by a perceived need to provide for domestic political order, since the military, particularly in developing countries, plays an important role in ensuring domestic tranquillity. Or the level of military spending may be related to interservice rivalry as each military service seeks to maximize its budgetary allocations. This is not to say that increased arms spending on the part of the adversary does not play a role, for such increases provide rationalizations for expanding one's own military efforts and, more important, can aid in obtaining public support for so doing.

Second, there is a tendency for arms spending to reflect past spending levels as opposed to the other side's behavior because of the pressure for military programs to expand in order to absorb whatever money is available. The United States' missile programs after 1954 owed their budgetary existence to the new plateaus of defense spending achieved during the Korean War.[30] Similarly, the end of the Vietnam War failed to result in any appreciable decrease in American military spending but, instead, facilitated the continuation of huge military budgets.

Third, defense spending may not be responsive to the military efforts of the other side because of frequent miscalculation of the latter's capabilities and intentions. The failure to find a good fit in United States–Soviet arms reciprocation may be due partly to the fact that each state has generally reacted to the other's projected strength, not its current strength. Indicative of some of the serious miscalculations that have resulted are the bomber gap of the 1950s and the missile gap of the early 1960s. In the latter instance the United States discovered through

29. John C. Lambelet, "A Complementary Analysis of the Anglo-German Dreadnought Race, 1905–1916," *Peace Science Society (International) Papers*, 26 (1976), 49–66.

30. Colin S. Gray, *The Soviet–American Arms Race* (Westmead, England: Saxon House, 1976), p. 107.

the use of U-2 overflights of Soviet territory that, rather than being far behind the Soviet Union in terms of missile capabilities, the United States was far ahead—so much so that it induced Khrushchev to make the reckless move of sending missiles to Cuba in 1962.

Fourth, arms race calculations are based on expenditures in a bilateral race and therefore do not take adequate account of the military threats of third parties. For example, how much of the Soviet military effort is related to its conflict with China rather than its concern about the threat posed by the United States? An examination of mathematical models of three-nation arms races suggests that two-way races would not escalate infinitely were it not for fear of third-party alliances.[31]

Fifth, work by Paul Smoker suggests that there may be differential rates of submissiveness in an arms race.[32] That is, one party or the other may begin to fear an uncontrollable arms race and, as a result, reduce its military spending when the race seems to be accelerating. If the other side does not share such fears, it is less likely to be responsive to the reduced arms effort.

Sixth, it may even be the case that lowered arms levels will increase the incentive for the other side to add to its military capabilities. According to one authority, the United States probably would not have tried to increase NATO's conventional forces in the 1960s had it not discovered fewer conventional forces in the Soviet Union than previously expected, thereby making it possible to defend Europe without going nuclear.[33] Similarly, the Soviet Union may not have undertaken its determined effort to improve its strategic capability had it not believed that parity with the United States was an achievable goal.

Most interesting from a foreign-policy perspective is the question of whether arms races lead to decisions to go to war. A study of recent wars argues that arms races and hot wars have been largely independent of each other.[34] The Korean War, for example, did not begin with an arms race; if anything, it started with a disarmament race as the United States sought to bring the troops home as rapidly as possible

31. John E. Hunter, "Mathematical Models of a Three-Nation Arms Race," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 24 (June 1980), 241.

32. Paul Smoker, "Fear in the Arms Race: A Mathematical Study," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1, no. 1 (1964), 55–63.

33. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 86.

34. John C. Lambelet, "Do Arms Races Lead to War?" *Journal of Peace Research*, 12, no. 2 (1975), 123–28.



after World War II. That arms races do not always end in war is also suggested by the naval race between England and France, which was widely held to have lasted for sixty-four years (1840–1904) during which no wars occurred. Despite one of the most violent arms races in history, there has been a dramatic decline in the frequency with which military confrontations involving major powers escalate into war. Since World War II only 8 percent of such confrontations were found to have resulted in war.[35]

Several studies have suggested that arms races lead to escalation and increased violence. One such study found that of twenty-six great power military confrontations coded during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that escalated to war, twenty-three were preceded by arms races. On the other hand, of seventy-two great power confrontations that did not result in war, only five were preceded by arms races.[36] An earlier study using data from the same period discovered a strong relationship between the rate of increase in armament spending and the number of wars begun in the subsequent five-year period.[37] This was so even when the influences of many other factors were controlled.

In a classic study of arms races, Samuel P. Huntington argued that the likelihood of war in such a race varies inversely with the length of time it has been in existence.[38] In effect, war is more likely in the early stage of an arms race, before peaceful patterns of action have been established. Huntington goes on to suggest that quantitative arms races are more likely to lead to war than qualitative ones. Quantitative races are believed to produce inequality, since one only slips further behind as the other side increases its armament. Qualitative races are seen as tending toward equality, for scientific advantages usually do not last very long in a highly technological world. Equality, in turn, is viewed by Huntington as decreasing the likelihood of war. Since quantitative

35. Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "Conflict in the International System, 1816–1977," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Patrick J. McGowan, eds., *Challenges to America: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979), p. 107.

36. Michael D. Wallace, "Arms Races and Escalation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 23 (March 1979), 3–16.

37. Michael D. Wallace, "Status, Formal Organization, and Arms Levels as Factors Leading to the Onset of War, 1820–1964," in Russett, *Peace, War, and Numbers*, pp. 49–69.

38. Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," *Public Policy*, 1958, pp. 41–86.

arms races generally involve a greater financial burden and produce greater tension, powerful pressures are created to end the race through either war or disarmament. Unfortunately, war has been a more frequent outcome than disarmament. Qualitative arms races, on the other hand, are seen by Huntington as involving merely a redeployment rather than an increase of arms budgets and, as such, do not produce the strains leading to war. This does not mean that qualitative arms races are benign, for pressure for war may arise if a state fears that the other side is about to achieve a scientific breakthrough that will dramatically change the military balance. To prevent such a possibility there will be a strong incentive to initiate a strike on the opposing state or its new weapons system, particularly if a state believes itself to be too far behind in the technological race. Qualitative arms races also raise the capacity to wreak greater death and destruction on the world.

## THE IMPACT OF THIRD PARTIES

So far we have discussed the action and reaction of states as if such behavior operated in a closed system with little input from the outside. Nothing could be further from the truth; each state is affected by the behavior and reactions of other states. Pressures from the outside in a dispute may include offers of mediation or economic, military, and political assistance. Relevant moves by external actors may also involve such negative sanctions as threats, condemnations, or the withdrawal of military, economic, or political support.

Numerous conflicts have been settled, or at least controlled, by the mediation efforts of third parties, as in the case of Theodore Roosevelt's mediation of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, which ended in the Treaty of Portsmouth; Alexei Kosygin's mediation of the Indo-Pakistani war, which resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Tashkent in 1966; and President Carter's efforts in helping achieve the 1979 Camp David Accords, which established the basis for peace between Egypt and Israel. But just as third powers have played the role of mediator in conflict situations, they have also involved themselves in other states' wars and in so doing have often determined the outcome. Interventions by outside powers in the 1956 Suez war, the October 1973 Middle East war, and the conflict in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) are but a few illustrations of such involvement.



Since external support, or at least noninterference, is of such critical importance to the military ventures of most states, particularly those with limited power, any calculation regarding a decision to go to war will obviously have to take into account the probable reaction of outside powers. States with extensive alliance support are more likely to initiate aggression, despite an imbalance in power capabilities, in the expectation that they will be aided by their allies. The North Korean incursion into South Korea in 1950 obviously was undertaken with the implicit or explicit approval of the Soviet Union. But just as anticipated support from the outside may encourage a would-be aggressor, an ally may also act to constrain behavior, as in the case of Soviet pressure on the People's Republic of China to end its shelling of the coastal islands of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958.

The decision makers of a state that is confronted with conflict are generally interested in developing as much support for their position in the international community as possible. The decision of the People's Republic of China to end the Great Cultural Revolution in 1969 and resume relations with the outside world was in no small measure related to the Sino-Soviet border conflict that erupted in that year. Within a short time China rejoined the international community by assuming the seat of China at the United Nations and began the process of establishing diplomatic relations with a large number of states, thus ending a long period of isolation. One of the major problems that confronted Iran in its war with Iraq in 1980–81 was its general isolation from the world because it had alienated many nations with its refusal to respect international legal norms by not returning the American hostages. Indeed, the war itself was one of the major factors facilitating the ultimate release of the hostages as Iran became increasingly concerned about ending the economic and military boycott imposed upon it.

Decision makers pay considerable attention to the behavior of other states in order to get clues as to how such states might respond to them in the future. China showed particular concern regarding the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the subsequent pronouncement of the Brezhnev doctrine, which held that the Soviet Union had a right to intervene in the affairs of other socialist states. The credibility of a deterrent threat will often be interpreted on the basis of how the state issuing such a threat carries out similar threats against other states. There has been some speculation, for example, that Khrushchev raised the Berlin issue to the level of a

crisis in 1961 because of President Kennedy's minimal support of the Cuban exiles during the Bay of Pigs disaster. Because of the fear of possible misinterpretation of deterrent intentions, efforts to deter a state may be motivated not so much by fear or concern about that particular state as by concern about how such efforts might be interpreted by other, more important states in the system. This is why it is often impossible to calculate what decision makers will do if one focuses narrowly on the concerns and relative capabilities of the states that are immediately involved in a conflict situation.

Third parties can affect the foreign policy of a state by playing the role of intermediary in a conflict situation. Such a role can be particularly important when the two disputing parties are not speaking to each other. In this instance the third party may serve as a messenger by shuttling from one disputant to the other, as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger did in attempting to bring peace to the Middle East. Also, the third party is able to make suggestions for solving the problem, and can point out where compromise is possible. Such recommendations may be accepted, particularly if the disputing parties view the third party as an objective outsider. In some instances, such as the Rann of Kutch arbitration of 1965 involving a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan, the parties may agree in advance to accept whatever recommendation is made by the arbitrator.

Outside powers have also been known to affect the behavior of the negotiating states by issuing threats and promises of reward, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. Henry Kissinger's manipulation of reward and punishment to try to resolve the Middle East conflict is a case in point. This aspect of third-power leverage does raise the question of whether only great powers can be effective in using such devices to ensure settlements, for most other states lack the necessary resources.

Third parties may also be able to facilitate the reaching of agreements by guaranteeing whatever settlement is made. Third-party guarantees of the Vietnam settlement and the monitoring techniques established after the October Middle East War are but two such examples. Finally, third parties may facilitate agreement by enabling the disputants to save face. In terms of one's own prestige, it may be easier for a state to make concessions to a third party than directly to its adversary. Britain, France, and Israel were able to save face in 1956 after the United States and the Soviet Union pressed them into ending their invasion of Suez by suggesting that they had merely intervened to stabilize the situation until the United Nations was able to take over.



Multiple-party involvement in peacemaking may make the process more difficult, as has been shown in a careful analysis of such efforts since the seventeenth century.[39] The author of that study noted that intervention by outside powers increased the complexity of the peacemaking by multiplying the number of decision makers to be satisfied and the number of decisions and possible settlements that might be reached. Recognizing some of the disadvantages of involving large numbers of states in the conflicts of other states, the founders of the United Nations included a provision in its charter that emphasized that disputants were first and foremost to attempt to resolve their conflicts themselves or regionally; only if those efforts were unsuccessful should the dispute be transmitted to the United Nations for consideration (Article 33).

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND FOREIGN POLICY

A third party that has become an important factor affecting the foreign policy of the nation-state in recent years is the international organization. Some idea of the impact of international organizations and the role they play in the foreign policy of states can be gained from the phenomenal increase in the number of such organizations in recent decades. In 1949, for example, there were only 38 international governmental organizations (IGOs), but in 1977 the number had increased to 261.[40]

A number of studies have attempted to determine whether international organizations have affected state behavior by making war less likely or at least ensuring that international conflicts will not escalate. Data from the Correlates of War project for the period 1816–1965 revealed that the amount of intergovernmental organization in the system had no measurable impact on the amount of war. However, that study did find that the rate of increase of such organizations had a slight *negative* association with the magnitude of war in the subsequent five-year period.[41] This would seem to provide some support for the

39. Randle Ripley, *The Origins of Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

40. William D. Coplin, *Introduction to International Politics*, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980), p. 119.

41. J. David Singer and Michael D. Wallace, "Intergovernmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1816–1965," *International Organization*, 24 (Summer 1970), 520–47.

notion that international organization tends to put a damper on international conflict. Another study discovered that the relationship between intergovernmental organizations and war differed, depending on whether IGO membership was aggregated to a system level or merely by country. Thus, for the period 1900–1964 there was a negative relationship between the existence of IGOs and war. On the other hand, the larger number of IGOs to which a nation belonged, the higher its conflict score.[42] What was probably being tapped in the latter instance was the impact of the relative size of states, since other research has shown that larger states tend to belong to more organizations as well as to engage in more conflict behavior.

Several studies have examined the impact of the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, on conflict behavior. K. J. Holsti, for example, found with respect to seventy-seven conflicts that occurred during the period 1919–65 that some 23 percent were partially or fully resolved with the help of international organizations. Of the forty-eight cases specifically placed on the agenda of the League of Nations or the United Nations, some 37 percent were successfully settled.[43] In another effort to judge the impact of international organization on peaceful settlement, Quincy Wright found that of the sixty-six political disputes handled by the League of Nations, thirty-five were resolved successfully and twenty were transfered to other agencies for consideration. Most of the eleven failures occurred after 1935, providing the League with a fairly impressive record for fifteen years.[44] A subsequent study by Wright of forty-five cases that came before the United Nations during its first twenty years of operation revealed that nine involved no military action, twenty resulted in the conclusion of hostilities with a formal or tacit cease-fire within the first year, and fourteen escalated for a longer period and with a greater number of casualties, while only two went to the stage of a general war.[45] Although this particular study revealed a fairly good record as far as controlling escalation was concerned, it does not necessarily provide evidence that the conflicts

42. James E. Harf, David G. Hoovler, and Thomas E. James, Jr., "Systemic and External Attributes in Foreign Policy Analysis," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Comparing Foreign Policies* (New York: Wiley, 1974), p. 240.

43. K. J. Holsti, "Resolving International Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (September 1966), 286–87.

44. Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 1431.

45. Quincy Wright, "The Escalation of International Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 9 (December 1965), 438.



studied have been resolved. Indeed, a cursory examination of the cases suggests that many conflicts in the postwar world have been perpetuated peacefully, with hostilities erupting over some issues from time to time.

The fact that permanent settlements often are not achieved in conflicts that come before the United Nations is supported by a study of fifty-five such disputes in the pre-1965 period. Almost half of these cases were recorded as unsettled, and only about one-third were settled in part or whole on the basis of the United Nations resolution. Despite the general belief that international organizations are incapable of affecting great-power behavior, the success rate of resolving disputes in which great powers were involved proved to be as high or higher than that of lesser states.[46]

Another evaluation, which is more pessimistic in its assessment of the effectiveness of international organization in peaceful settlement, found that in over one hundred international wars and crises since World War II less than 20 percent of the instances elicited a United Nations resolution calling for a halt to the threat or act of force. Of the cases in which such action was called for, success was achieved in only about half of the cases—success in this instance being defined as compliance by the parties soon after the United Nations directive was issued.[47] This more pessimistic assessment of the effectiveness of the United Nations is undoubtedly due in part to the fact that the cases include instances through 1977. As in the case of the League, the effectiveness of the United Nations in discouraging the use of the military option appears to have declined over time.

The success rates of regional organizations have been found to be not much higher than that of the United Nations. In a study of the collective security successes of the United Nations and three regional organizations, Mark W. Zacher scored only 18 percent of the 116 cases of conflict between members occurring during the period 1946–77 as showing success. In a further breakdown, success was recorded for the United Nations in only 9 percent of the 93 cases examined; for the Organization of African Unity, success was scored at 19 percent (N = 26); the Arab League scored 12 percent (N = 17); and the Organization

46. Ernst B. Haas, "Collective Security and the Future International System," University of Denver Monograph Series in World Affairs no. 5 (Denver, 1967–68), pp. 44, 51.

47. Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher, "The United Nations and Collective Security: Retrospect and Prospect," p. 3 (Paper delivered at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, 1980).

of American States (OAS) was successful in 37 percent of its 19 cases.[48] The relatively high success rate of the latter is in no small measure a product of the fact that the United States dominates the organization and can assure adequate force to back up organizational decisions with which it agrees. On occasion it has even been the practice of the United States to decide how to respond to a crisis and only then take the issue to the OAS for approval. Such was the case with respect to the United States' decision to establish a quarantine around Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis.

In an analysis of nineteen conflicts in which the three regional organizations included in the Zacher study participated, it was discovered that these organizations helped settle roughly one-third of the conflicts. In seven of the sixteen cases that involved actual fighting, the regional organization concerned was effective in helping to end the hostilities.[49]

Once a decision has been made, the question arises as to how effective international organization is in obtaining compliance. The record is clearly mixed. Ernst Haas found, on the basis of experiences through 1965, very few cases in which the order to honor a United Nations–sponsored truce was not obeyed by the parties involved.[50] Peace forces were shown to have been effective whenever they were created. A necessary but not sufficient reason for the effectiveness of such peacekeeping forces was great-power involvement, according to a study of seven United Nations peacekeeping cases compared with instances in which peacekeeping intervention was absent.[51]

The ability of international organizations to control the conflict behavior of states would appear quite limited, given the results of the studies just cited. However, there is a fundamental problem involved in such quantitative studies: One cannot count the number of wars or conflicts that did *not* arise because of the constraints decision makers might have felt as a result of the existence of such organizations. In assessing the role of international organizations on foreign policy, one should also keep in mind that such organizations serve as machinery

48. Mark W. Zacher, *International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946–77* (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 214.

49. Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 170.

50. Haas, "Collective Security and the Future International System," p. 51.

51. N. A. Pelcovits, "Local Conflict and UN Peacekeeping," *International Studies Quarterly*, 20 (December 1976), 533–52.



that can be used by states in pursuit of their foreign policies. It has even been suggested that bringing issues before the United Nations may be viewed as a hostile act. States often use the United Nations in an effort to justify their legal claims, to embarrass the other side, or to rally other members to their own position, motives that have little to do with resolving conflict.[52]

It may be that the importance of international organization for foreign policy lies not so much in its immediate effect on conflict resolution as in its role as a long-term socializing agent that can gradually make the world's decision makers more responsive to the need for international understanding. Several studies have examined the impact of experience in parliamentary bodies on the participants' world-mindedness and support for international solutions to problems. Studies examining the impact of experience with international organizations on members of the United States Congress have generally concluded that the experience was a positive one.[53] Robert E. Riggs discovered that members who had participated in General Assembly meetings tended to pay more attention to the United Nations in subsequent speeches as well as to experience a positive change in affect toward the organization. David A. Karns found that although overall changes in affect were small after attendance at an initial meeting, there were significant positive changes after controlling for party, ideology, and degree of previous isolationism.

A later study comparing American and Norwegian legislators and civil servants revealed that there was no simple linear relationship between participation in international organizations and positive affect. In terms of support for the transfer of sovereignty, the results showed that experience tended only to make the participant more negative on the issue. As a general rule, the study found that international agencies working on specific technical problems tended to win greater approval from national politicians than organizations identified with higher-level political-diplomatic debate.[54]

52. Abraham Yeselson and Anthony Gaglione, *A Dangerous Place: The United Nations as a Weapon in International Politics* (New York: Grossman, 1974).

53. Robert E. Riggs, "One Small Step for Functionalism: UN Participation and Attitude Change," *International Organization*, 31 (Summer 1977), 515–39, and David A. Karns, "The Effect of Interparliamentary Meetings on the Foreign Policy Attitudes of United States Congressmen," *International Organization*, 31 (Summer 1977), 497–514.

54. Robert E. Riggs and I. Jostein Mykletun, *Beyond Functionalism: Attitudes Toward International Organization in Norway and the United States* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), p. 159.

Two studies of participation in European parliamentary bodies have uncovered little or no change resulting from the experience. The fact that there may have been little affective change in these instances may have been due to preselection, however, as those who already favored European unity opted for such a role. There was little need to change their attitudes, since they were already positive.[55]

## CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Beyond being affected by the behavior of various other actors in the international system, whether they be nations or groups of nations, foreign-policy decision makers are also influenced by the general characteristics and norms of the international system. That system is not immutable; it changes over time. These changes may even have an impact on the various determinants of foreign policy, some of which may be relevant in one historical epoch but not in another. There is a general belief, for example, that the rise of nuclear weapons has fundamentally changed the nature of the international system, and it may therefore be inappropriate in certain instances to draw analogies with other periods in history. As will be shown shortly, the work of the Correlates of War project has revealed in several instances that such variables as alliances and polarization had different effects in the world of the nineteenth century than they have in the current century. For these reasons it is necessary to examine the implications of the total system on state behavior.

Two recent studies have provided detailed illustrations of various international systems, suggesting the tendency of such systems and their participants to assume certain common characteristics. Robert G. Wesson has noted that state systems like those of classical Greece, pre-imperial China, and the nation-state system of Europe tend to develop a single culture, although with some local variation. He also argues that state systems that are organized as unitary actors are prone to build grandiose monuments, such as the pyramids, the great wall of China, and the Roman Colosseum, while pluralistic state systems are

55. G. Matthew Bonham, "Participation in Regional Parliamentary Assemblies: Effect on Attitudes of Scandinavian Parliamentarians," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 8 (June 1975), 325, and Henry H. Kern, Jr., "Changing Attitudes Through International Participation: European Parliamentarians and Integration," *International Organization*, 27 (Winter 1973), 45–83.



freer to enrich themselves through trade or to experiment with science or the arts. Although pluralistic state systems may "wear themselves out by warfare, empires choke themselves by unity."[56]

The basic thesis presented by Evan Luard in his study of seven historical international systems, beginning with ancient China and ending with the current age of ideology, is that the system itself shapes the character of the participants so that they become pretty much alike in terms of motives, means, stratification, internal structure, roles, norms, and institutions.[57] Such similarities are not merely a result of copying the styles and modes of behavior of other states in the system; they are also products of systemic structures that affect all participants equally. For example, systems that are dominated by international tension tend to produce states that are suspicious and circumspect in their foreign policies. Such tension may also lead to increased centralization of decision making within the state. States that are in conflict with each other are also likely to adopt similar military strategies. Thus, if guerrilla war is utilized by one side, it will force the other to develop similar capabilities in order to compete effectively.

Those who emphasize systemic factors as a primary explanation of foreign-policy behavior correspondingly tend to deemphasize domestic determinants. Since the system determines the response, differences in economic and political structure or leadership style are seen as largely irrelevant to foreign-policy choices, as each nation tends to behave substantially like any other nation.

Among the most important system characteristics are the norms and laws adhered to by the international society involved. Decision makers want to put on the best face possible, making their decisions appear both moral and legal. If it becomes a choice between two options, both of which are viewed as likely to solve a given problem, decision makers are likely to choose the one they believe to be more moral as well as legal.

Decision makers seem to take international law quite seriously, if the deliberateness with which they engage in treaty making is any indication. This activity seems not to be engaged in frivolously in the belief that it is always possible to renege later. The Soviet record on compliance with international treaties is quite good, according to one statistical assessment. In an analysis of compliance with 2,475 treaties

56. Robert G. Wesson, *State Systems* (New York: Free Press, 1978), pp. 10–15.

57. Evan Luard, *Types of International Society* (New York: Free Press, 1976).

during the period 1918–57, it was calculated that the Soviet infidelity ratio was 11.5 per thousand, or somewhat less than 1.2 percent. This is to say that the Soviet Union fails to honor a political promise, on the average, in only about one month out of every 120 (10 years) over which it is bound, keeping the promise for the other 119 months.[58] If one were to look at the United States' compliance record, it is probable that one would find similar impressive results. At the same time, there are some glaring failures in that record. For example, the United States violated the OAS Charter with its involvement in the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatamala in 1954, its Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, and its intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Former Senator Frank Church estimated that in the latter instance the United States had violated no fewer than eighteen treaty covenants.[59]

Compliance with international law is related not only to living up to treaty commitments but also to observing the customary behavior of civilized states. The advantages of customary rules over treaty law have been summarized by Edward McWhinney: Customary rules do not pin down the prestige of actors in changing circumstances that may require them to reassess the situation; they do not raise the negative problems often involved in formal agreements, such as the embarrassment created when one is trying to renege because of changing circumstances; and they allow decision makers to bypass the bureaucratic process involved in treaty making as well as the need to obtain the approval of alliance partners. On the other hand, such rules are often imprecise, misunderstood, or contradictory.[60]

Since so much of international law is based on customary behavior, the new states feel that they did not participate in its development and are consequently often hostile toward its application. A study of reactions to the negotiations on the law of the seas held in Geneva in 1958 and 1960 is revealing on this point. According to its author, the "dissatisfied" states, which were largely new states, saw international law as a device to camouflage self-interest and allow the few to dominate the many. Legal detail was seen by such states as a trap for them,

58. Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser, *The Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962).

59. Cited in Margaret G. Hermann, ed., *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders* (New York: Free Press, 1977).

60. Edward McWhinney, *Peaceful Coexistence and Soviet-Western International Laws* (Leyden, The Netherlands: Sithoff, 1964), pp. 181–94.



and as a result, they tended to prefer general statements over more exact definitions.[61]

States do occasionally flout international legal decisions, as in the case of Iran's reaction to the hostage decision delivered by the International Court of Justice in 1980. A majority of the states in the international system have also placed reservations on the compulsory-jurisdiction clause of the International Court of Justice, thereby keeping many issues out of the World Court. As a result, the Court has been able to determine only a handful of cases annually.

International law has advanced further with respect to some substantive areas than others. This is particularly true in the case of commercial and transportation policy. Commercial interaction, as in scheduling airlines, railroads, and postal deliveries, requires considerable coordination on an international scale. To achieve such coordination, states have relinquished certain sovereign rights and have been willing to accept the position of the majority in order to accomplish the necessary tasks. The global rise of terrorism has also inspired considerable effort to develop international conventions that will help solve the problem.

The supranational authority of international legal institutions has developed furthest in Europe, where the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the Common Market) has the power to levy fines on individuals and corporations. Individuals who believe that their human rights have been violated by their own national governments may petition the European Commission on Human Rights to investigate the case and perhaps even take the matter to the European Court of Human Rights. This procedure has been particularly successful in compelling states to change laws that are found to be in violation of the Convention on Human Rights. Domestic courts have also often applied provisions of the Convention directly in rulings involving their own citizens.[62]

Although buffeted by the forces of nationalism and other "isms," international law continues to flourish and to expand in scope. States appear to be genuinely concerned with having their moves interpreted

61. Robert L. Friedheim, "The Satisfied and Dissatisfied States Negotiate International Law," *World Politics*, 18 (October 1965), 20–41.

62. For a discussion of such instances see Jane S. Jensen and Lloyd Jensen, "The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and National Law," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, 1980.

and justified from a legal perspective. They continue to support international legal structures as useful devices in the execution of their foreign policy.

## THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

Perhaps the most critical systemic characteristic affecting the foreign policy of a state is the way power is distributed in the international system. Balance-of-power theorists hold that in the pursuit of power states will react to the efforts of others to change the power balance of the system, and in so doing will produce peace and a certain level of international stability. In accordance with the classical balance-of-power theory, some leaders have purposefully undertaken the role of balancer, as in the case of Henry VIII, to whom is attributed the maxim *Cui adhaero praeest* (He whom I support will prevail). According to one story, Henry had a portrait of himself painted in which he held in one hand a pair of scales labeled, respectively, "Austria" and "France." In the other hand he held a weight that was capable of tipping the balance toward one side or the other.[63]

The debate over the optimum distribution of power has revolved around the issue of whether bipolarity or multipolarity provides greater international stability. Kenneth N. Waltz, one of the most prominent proponents of bipolarity, has suggested four arguments in favor of its stabilizing effects:

1. There are no peripheries with only two world powers, as both sides involve themselves in happenings throughout the globe, resulting in a solid and determinate balance.
2. Not only is the competition extensive, it is also intensive, as each power becomes concerned about even minor changes of the balance.
3. There is a tendency to develop schemes for coping with recurrent crises.
4. With preponderant power, minor shifts in the power balance will not be decisive.[64]

63. Arthur Cyr, *British Foreign Policy and the Atlantic Area* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), p. 10.

64. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Summer 1964, pp. 881–909.



In examining these arguments, it might be noted that bipolarity does not reduce the motivation for expansion but may increase it, owing to concern with establishing ever-wider buffer areas. One might also question whether peace can be achieved when nations are involved in recurring crises, any one of which may slip over the threshold into violence. Finally, Waltz's suggestion that polarized powers will intervene when minor changes in the balance are threatened may not be entirely accurate. Superpowers may realize that their states enjoy overwhelming force in a bipolarized system, making it unnecessary to be concerned about minor power shifts, as Waltz admits. Instead of intervention, they may prefer isolation, particularly since intervention may lead them into a nuclear war in defense of an ally.

Several arguments favoring multipolarity have been suggested in other studies, which have made the following points:

1. There will be greater opportunities for interaction in a multipolar system, which increases the prospects of achieving national goals by dealing with different states if necessary.
2. With multipolarity, crosscutting loyalties will exist. Every issue will not be viewed as a zero sum game in which everything gained by one participant is immediately assumed to be lost by the other.
3. Multipolarity diminishes the amount of attention paid to other states and conflict situations. By thus limiting preoccupation with any one conflict, the total amount of violence may be reduced.
4. A multipolar system will hold down the arms race. Not every increment of power on the part of other actors will be viewed as directed against oneself, but may be seen as a reaction to one of the many other states in the system.
5. Multipolarity provides mediators who can help in a conflict in a positive way, as suggested earlier in our discussion of the role of third parties.[65]

Those who favor a balance-of-power system tend to support multipolarity as a necessary prerequisite for its successful operation. There

65. Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (September 1966), 314–37, and Kjell Goldman, *Tension and Détente in Bipolar Europe* (Stockholm: Esselte Studium, 1974).

must be an opportunity to shift alliances so that threats to the peace can be countered by new aggregations of power. With more than two major powers, there will always be concern that other states in the system will align with one's enemy and thus tilt the balance. The hope is that the uncertainty that is introduced will act to deter the would-be aggressor.

Considerable research has been conducted in recent years on the relationship between alliances and polarization, on the one hand, and the decision of states to engage in conflict behavior, on the other. Much of this work has been conducted under the auspices of the Correlates of War project under the direction of Professor J. David Singer of the University of Michigan. The project has collected data on the frequency, magnitude, and intensity of war in the international system for every year since 1815. This has been supplemented with data related to numerous other variables, such as alliances, international organizations, population, and power. One of the earliest studies emanating from the project found that there was a small positive relationship between the amount of alliance aggregation and the frequency and magnitude of war. When they divided the data between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the authors of the study discovered that alliance aggregation did not lead to war during the earlier century, but was closely related to war in the current one.[66] Alliances thus seemed to be a factor for peace in the nineteenth century but a factor for war in the twentieth. The pattern of the twentieth century was confirmed in a later study from the same project, which found that 84 percent of the wars in the present century began in years following rising systemic tightness.[67]

One possible factor contributing to the failure of alliances to deter war in the present century is the reluctance of some states to live up to their obligations. A study by Alan Sabrosky has revealed that alliances were nearly five times as likely to be violated in the twentieth century as in the nineteenth century. However, such violations have not been typical, scoring only 14 percent of the cases in the present century and 3 percent in the previous one.[68]

66. J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1815–1945," in Singer, *Quantitative International Politics*, pp. 247–86.

67. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 22 (June 1978), 241–68.

68. Alan Ned Sabrosky, "Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War," in J. David Singer, ed., *The Correlates of War, Volume II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models* (New York: Free Press, 1980), p. 177.



It appears that the duration of the alliance may make some difference in the likelihood of war, as a reanalysis of the Singer–Small study has suggested. By controlling for duration, the data for the nineteenth century revealed a positive correlation between war involvement and alliance activities.[69] In other words, alliances that persist over longer periods tend to increase the possibility of war. This was confirmed in yet another study, based on events leading up to World War I, which found that if there is a prolonged period of alliance aggregation around the same power center, the system tends to be more prone to war.[70] The existence of alliances with belligerents clearly increases participation in war, but other explanations are also necessary, since almost half of the participants in wars during the period 1815–1965 were not aligned.[71]

Michael D. Wallace, in an analysis involving data from the Correlates of War project, discovered a curvilinear relationship between alliance polarization and the amount of war in the system.[72] Increased war activity was found when polarization was very tight, pulling all members into the war, or when the system was very diffuse, increasing the number of unprotected states that could be attacked.

A survey of the operation of twenty-one international subsystems in Asia, Europe, and Hawaii since 1649 found that the most stable system was a unipolar one, such as an empire. Control in such a case was often retained by the preponderant force of the central decision makers in the system.[73] As in other studies noted earlier, bipolar systems tended to have less frequent but more prolonged wars, often wars of a localized nature around the peripheries. Multipolar systems were found to generate more violence, more countries at war, and more casualties.

Perhaps part of the discrepancy in studies that relate polarization to war is due to the fact, noted by Johan Galtung, that polarization is a

69. William B. Moul, "The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 6, no. 3 (September 1973), 494–513.

70. Alan Ned Sabrosky, "From Bosnia to Sarajevo," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 19 (March 1975), 3–24.

71. Randolph M. Siverson and Joel King, "Alliances and the Expansion of War," in J. David Singer, ed., *To Augur Well* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 37–49.

72. Michael D. Wallace, *War and Rank Among Nations* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973).

73. Michael Haas, "International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (March 1970), 98–123.

two-edged sword. "It serves both escalation, by providing enough distance to organize and deal with antagonists in a highly violent way, and deescalation, by reducing the contact surface to a minimum, possibly even to zero."[74]

There appears to be considerable evidence that a preponderance of power in the hands of a status quo state or group of states can lessen the likelihood that other states will resort to the use of force. Britain's preponderant power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which allowed it to dominate the seas, was in no small measure related to the relative peace that prevailed during the period. A study of Asian dyads over the period 1950–69 revealed that overwhelming power, defined as a ratio of at least ten to one, substantially reduced the risk of war.[75] Similar results were shown in a study of thirty dyadic interstate wars over the period 1816–1965, which found that when power was closer to parity there was actually more conflict.[76] Findings like these suggest that if one wants international stability it is not a balance of power, defined in terms of an equilibrium, that one should seek but, rather, a preponderance.

Systemic polarity will also affect the way decisions are made, both within alliances and within states. The tighter the polarity, the more centralized the decision-making process in both organizations. Efforts are made to develop a unified position within an alliance before presenting proposals to the other side. This is illustrated by disarmament negotiations, in which, during the years of tight bipolarity, the NATO allies developed their proposals first and then presented them to the Soviet Union. In an age of decreased bipolarity, efforts were not always taken to get the allies' approval first. This was particularly true with respect to the negotiations for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which was opened for signature in 1968. In this instance the United States and the Soviet Union had an interest in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and controlling nuclear energy—goals that were not always shared by American and Soviet allies. Even less consultation was undertaken with respect to the SALT negotiations.

74. Johan Galtung, "Peace Thinking," in Albert Lepawsky et al., eds., *The Search for World Order* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 130.

75. Erich Weede, "Overwhelming Preponderance as a Pacifying Condition Among Contiguous Asian Dyads, 1950–69," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 20 (September 1976), 395–411.

76. David Garnham, "Dyadic International War, 1816–1965: The Role of Power Parity and Geographical Proximity," *Western Political Quarterly*, 29 (June 1976), 231–42.

## CONCLUSION

The importance of the external variable as a determinant of foreign policy is obvious. If there were no external inputs, there would be no need for a foreign policy. Action–reaction models have been found to have some predictive accuracy for both conflict behavior and negotiations. There is also some evidence that such processes may fuel an arms race. At the same time, some studies comparing the predictive value of action–reaction models and past-behavior models have found the latter to be more accurate, particularly as bureaucratic inertia sets in.

Foreign-policy determination is not limited to dyadic interaction, since third parties can also have an impact on the decisions made by a pair of disputing states. Such third parties may either serve a mediating role or may induce greater conflict by siding with one party or the other.

International organizations, which have shown remarkable growth in recent decades, have a special role to play in influencing the foreign policy of a state, particularly in its conflict behavior. It is difficult to make a precise evaluation of the impact of such organizations, for one cannot easily count wars that did not arise as a result of the existence of international organizations. Nevertheless, there is some impressive evidence suggesting that several international disputes were prevented from escalating further. The records of both the League of Nations and the United Nations seem to suggest a decline in their effectiveness over time as conflict managers. Perhaps what may be more salient to foreign policy in the future is the socializing effect of participation in international organizations by national decision makers, since such participation may help develop international understanding among important leaders.

A number of characteristics of the international system appear to shape foreign-policy behavior. States that interact in the same international system tend to assume similar forms of behavior. The system itself has a modifying effect on all states, regardless of their particular domestic structures. Systemic tension, for example, tends to lead to increased centralization in foreign-policy decision making in all states. The norms and laws of the international system, although perhaps not as important as other systemic characteristics, have had some restraining influence on policy, since states like to appear both moral and lawful.