5 THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Foreign policy is affected by much more than simply societal conditions and beliefs, since such policy has to be made within the context of a political structure, which in turn affects the outcome. National myths and societal conditions obviously shape the foreign-policy goals and general view of the world held by the foreign-policy elites of each state, but for goals to be obtained, decisions need to be made on foreign-policy choices. The way decisions are made and which actors participate in the making of those decisions have an important impact on the content of the choices made. In this chapter our focus will be on the domestic political determinants of foreign policy, as we concentrate on the effects of various institutional arrangements and domestic actors on the conduct and content of foreign policy. We shall begin by contrasting the impact of democratic and authoritarian structures on foreign policy.

DEMOCRATIC VERSUS AUTHORITARIAN STRUCTURES

A number of writers have been critical of the more democratic processes in foreign policy, feeling that they are simply not as effective as the more authoritarian or aristocratic forms. For example,

the French chronicler of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, argued that the management of foreign affairs requires knowledge, secrecy, judgment, planning and perseverence, qualities in which autocratic systems are superior to democratic ones.[1] In a similar vein, Walter Lippmann criticized democratic foreign policy making on the ground that the mass public is generally uninformed about foreign policy and will always opt for taking the easy way out of situations that demand more assertive action.[2] Raymond Aron has also criticized democratic decision making because of the danger of "conservative paralysis" and a corresponding inability to deal with pressing problems.[3]

If one is looking simply at the effectiveness and efficiency of foreign policy, there are several reasons why one might expect the more authoritarian structure to perform in a superior fashion. In the first place, the more authoritarian structure ought to be able to make more rapid decisions, since by definition it is not as responsive to a mass public and usually involves a smaller number of elites who need to be consulted or at least considered in the decision-making process. Moreover, less intraorganizational bargaining is required, since opposition from within the bureaucracy can be bypassed or crushed.

Second, the effectiveness and efficiency of the authoritarian regime is enhanced by the fact that it can better ensure compliance with its foreign-policy decisions, for there is a clear hierarchy of command, and the punishment for noncompliance may be harsh. The failure of subordinates to carry out President Kennedy's order to remove the intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Turkey some months prior to the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 would have been less likely in a state like the Soviet Union. This failure in implementation had an adverse impact on American foreign policy, for it provided the Soviet Union with an apparent justification for stationing missiles in Cuba in retaliation for the United States' placement of similar missiles near the borders of the Soviet Union.

Third, the centralization of foreign-policy decision-making power enables the more authoritarian regime to present a united front in its

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 1 (New York: Knopf, 1945), pp. 234–35.

2. Walter Lippmann, *The Public Philosophy* (New York: Mentor, 1955), pp. 23–24.

3. Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), p. 67.

foreign policy, as all spokesmen are expected to follow the party line. On the other hand, owing to their pluralism democracies often speak with several voices. This lack of unity might be particularly disadvantageous when a state is attempting to present a credible deterrent or even a promise of reward, only to find its position undercut by others in the foreign-policy establishment.

At the same time that an authoritarian regime can guarantee a more consistent external presentation of its foreign-policy views and thereby enhance the credibility of the message it desires to present, such a regime would seem to enjoy a fourth advantage in that it can pursue a more adaptable foreign policy that is responsive to changing conditions. Since, by definition, the authoritarian regime is less constrained by the mass public and the number of different groups it has to satisfy, it need not wait until the mood of either the elite or the public changes to make a shift in policy. President Franklin D. Roosevelt felt quite constrained in his desire to involve the United States in the Allied cause prior to World War II. Various Democratic Presidents who wanted to open up relations with the People's Republic of China prior to President Nixon's initiative in 1972 felt impeded by what they perceived as public opposition to such a move. The Soviet Union has been able to make some radical departures from its foreign-policy course with minimal internal repercussions, as in the case of Khrushchev's announcement of peaceful coexistence with capitalism presented at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956.

A fifth advantage for the authoritarian regime is the ability to pursue contradictory policies at the same time, if such a strategy is desirable for obtaining a given foreign-policy goal. During his tenure as secretary of defense, James Schlesinger complained that, in contrast to the United States, a "closed society like the Soviet Union has no difficulty in pursuing detente and simultaneously strengthening its defense efforts."[4] Publicizing detente in a more democratic regime, on the other hand, is likely to make it more difficult for the decision makers to convince the public that increased military spending is necessary.

Most of these advantages of authoritarian regimes derive from the alleged freedom of action that such a regime enjoys, given its minimal need to be responsive to the public and other interested groups. But one can perhaps exaggerate the amount of decisional latitude that dictators

4. Cited in P. Williams and M. H. Smith, "The Conduct of Foreign Policy in Democratic and Authoritarian States," *Yearbook of World Affairs*, (London: Stevens, 1976), p. 205.

enjoy in the making of foreign policy. Although the foreign-policy elite is smaller in authoritarian regimes like the Soviet Union than in democratic regimes, experts on the subject have increasingly noted that struggles similar to those involved in the political process of a democratic polity are now occurring within the Politburo of the Communist party and among bureaucratic agencies and interest groups.

Perhaps the most serious deficiency for the authoritarian regime lies in the fact that it may be severely hampered when it comes to policy innovation. Since its command and control structure is so centralized and there is a tendency toward paranoia in such structures, authoritarian regimes often generate "yes men" who tend to accept whatever the dictator desires (or whatever the subordinates think the dictator desires). Initiative is lost in such a system, and there is no opportunity to explore a range of options. Reliance on heavily centralized structures with their emphasis on secrecy and isolation from external criticism also destroys the opportunity to tap fresh viewpoints and obtain new information. As a result, there is a tendency for the foreign policy of an authoritarian system to rely extensively on precedent, particularly with respect to minor issues, which the higher-level bureaucracy is too busy to determine and the lower levels of the bureaucracy have no authority to decide. A rigid, rather than flexible, foreign policy tends to be the outcome of such structural arrangements.

Kenneth Waltz has suggested yet other reasons why an authoritarian government does not have a natural advantage over a democratic government in the making of foreign policy. Among these is the argument that authoritarian regimes blind themselves and stultify their successors' development. Moreover, such regimes are not immune to the politics of interest groups and have to worry about the relationship of the policies they espouse to their own political fortunes. Waltz concludes that "democracies less often enjoy the brilliant success that bold acts secretly prepared and ruthlessly executed may bring. With the ground of action more thoroughly prepared and the content of policy more widely debated, they may suffer fewer resounding failures."[5]

The relative efficiency and effectiveness of the two polar types of government have been examined in several empirical studies, but the results are far from conclusive. Frederick S. Butler and Scott Taylor

5. Kenneth Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 311.

were particularly interested in the effect of various types of decision-making structures on the consistency of foreign policy as well as the ability to adapt to changing conditions.[6] On the basis of data collected by the CREON Project at Ohio State University, which covered some thirty-two nations during the period 1959–68, they found that governments that were categorized as more accountable or democratic showed more consistency in their foreign policy and were better able to adapt to changes in the international system than authoritarian regimes. These patterns persisted when the researchers controlled for the size and level of development of the state, which were also believed to affect consistency and adaptability. It should be noted, however, that although virtually all of the specific indicators were in the predicted direction, only a minority of the relationships were significant at the .05 level.

Similar results were found in yet another CREON study, which discovered that, among several indicators of regime constraints, accountability and constraints arising from legislative and tenure considerations explained the most variation in foreign-policy behavior. The more accountable regimes in the study were found to pursue a more cautious, less expansive, and less dramatic foreign policy than regimes that were less constrained.[7]

In addition to questions of consistency, adaptability, and general efficiency in the making of foreign policy, it has been asserted that authoritarian regimes, which are generally able to keep their negotiating positions secret, can be more effective in international negotiations. In the first place, democratic pressure to publicize positions taken in negotiations may create constraints to making further concessions or force rejection of an agreement in which the public feels that too much was compromised. For example, United States bargaining over the Test Ban Treaty in the early 1960s was adversely affected as domestic enemies of the treaty argued that the United States' movement from asking for twenty on-site inspections to as few as six, in contrast to the Soviet proposals, which ranged between zero and three, represented a

6. Frederick I. Butler and Scott Taylor, "Toward an Explanation of Consistency and Adaptability in Foreign Policy Behavior: The Role of Political Accountability," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1975.

7. Barbara G. Salmore and Stephen A. Salmore, "Regime Constraints and Foreign Policy Behavior," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1975.

giveaway by the United States. Soviet negotiators might be expected to enjoy greater flexibility in the negotiating process, because they are able to keep their concessionary behavior secret and can be less responsive to public, parliamentary, and interest-group opinion. The same latitude in making conciliatory moves, of course, also enables the Soviet Union to be inflexible and intractable should it decide that such a strategy is in its interest.

A more serious impediment for a democratic state in the pursuit of its negotiating goals lies in the greater possibility that such a state's bargaining strategy will be communicated to the adversary in advance owing to informational leakages. Henry A. Kissinger was particularly disturbed by the 1970 publication by a *Los Angeles Times* reporter of the United States' fallback position in the SALT negotiations.[8] In fact, this incident was largely responsible for Kissinger's support for the wiretapping of some of his colleagues as well as certain reporters.

There is considerable difference of opinion as to whether democracies have been less belligerent than authoritarian regimes in their conduct of foreign policy. Totalitarian states have been viewed as quite willing and able to initiate war for several reasons: they can mobilize great military power; they are predisposed to unlimited action; they are predisposed to engage in war for economic reasons; and they are better able to exploit situations, for they can decide to go to war without the approval of the people.[9] But one can also cite examples that seem to suggest that liberal and democratic governments have frequently been less than peaceloving. Democratic Athens was said to have engaged in more foreign conquests than its authoritarian rival, Sparta, while the Japanese, despite the prevalence of militarism within their society, lived in isolation for many centuries. Similarly, Tito's Yugoslavia and Franco's Spain have been quite peaceful in their external relations, whereas the liberal regimes of Britain and France pursued vigorous imperialist policies, particularly during the nineteenth century. But as Evan Luard reminds us, Britain and France may not have been expansionist because they were democratic. Rising prosperity, commerce, and a sense of adventure may have induced both the development of democracy and the desire for expansion.[10]

8. John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 6.

9. Alastair Buchan, *War in Modern Society* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 21–24.

10. Evan Luard, *Types of International Society* (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 122.

Empirical studies relating democratic and authoritarian regimes to foreign conflict behavior are divided in their findings. Quincy Wright, in his monumental study of war covering the past six centuries, concluded that democracies are generally slower to move into war, yet once they have done so they fight as vigorously as or more vigorously than authoritarian regimes.[11] Perhaps a major factor in the hesitancy with which a democratic regime goes to war is related to concern that an opposition party will rally the public against the war, particularly if the war threatens to be a long, inconclusive one. Russett and Monsen suggested that a similar pattern exists in business firms, where decision makers in an openly held corporation perceive the shareholders as more ready to punish them for costly failures than to reward them for successful risk taking.[12] They hypothesized, therefore, that more accountable regimes would be less likely to engage in war, particularly since their tenure is likely to be threatened if the war turns into a lengthy one, as in the cases of Korea and Vietnam. Their findings failed to confirm the hypothesis, although the relationship was in the predicted direction.

Several other quantitative studies find that democratic governments are slightly less likely than authoritarian regimes to engage in foreign conflict behavior, as was suggested in the last chapter. These include Haas' analysis of data for a number of states covering the period 1900–1960, two studies by Salmore and Salmore that found that accountable regimes are significantly more cooperative and generally less active in the external arena than less accountable regimes, and Wilkenfeld's reanalysis of dimensionality of nations data, which showed that the decision makers of democratic regimes were less likely to utilize external conflict behavior to divert public attention from domestic problems.[13]

On the other hand, a study of seventy-seven nations for the period 1955–57 found that there was no relationship between degree of to-

11. Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 842.

12. Bruce M. Russett and R. Joseph Monsen, "Bureaucracy and Polyarchy as Predictors of Performance: A Cross National Examination," *Comparative Political Studies*, 8 (April 1975), 5–31.

13. Michael Haas, "Societal Approaches to the Study of War," *Journal of Peace Research* 2, no. 4 (1965), 307–23; Barbara G. Salmore and Stephen R. Salmore, "Political Regimes and Foreign Policy," in Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore, and Charles F. Hermann, eds., *Why Nations Act* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), p. 122; Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign Conflict," in Jonathan Wilkenfeld, ed., *Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics* (New York: David McKay, 1973), pp. 107–23.

talitarianism and foreign conflict behavior.[14] Rosenau and Hoggard, utilizing event data collected from the *New York Times* for the period 1966–69, found a positive relationship between the more democratic governments and their conflict behavior, although the relationship was less potent in predicting conflict behavior than the size of the state and its level of development.[15] Two earlier studies utilizing data from both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also found that democracies have been neither more peaceful nor more warlike than autocratic states.[16]

The extent to which a democratic polity shows a more peaceful orientation in foreign policy may be due to the fact that democratic values instill a belief in the importance of compromise, which is then applied internationally. The more conciliatory orientation taken by a democracy can be illustrated by a study that found that the more open or democratic political systems tended to utilize international courts or general international organizations more frequently than the more closed systems.[17] Also increasingly removed from the repertoire of the democratic regimes are actions that are perceived as inhumane or immoral by the public. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, observed that a discrepancy between the external conduct of a democratic society and its internal norms is no longer possible, for mass communication would quickly expose the gulf and undercut the support needed for it to be effective.[18] One need only reflect on the public outcry in the United States in response to the exposure of the Central Intelligence Agency's role in assassination plots against foreign leaders. Similarly, a democratic and liberal orientation is likely to lead one to reject food boycotts and economic blockades as a means of foreign policy except in the direst national emergency.

14. Rudolph J. Rummel, "The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behavior," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 207.

15. James N. Rosenau and Gary Hoggard, "Foreign Policy Behavior in Dyadic Relationships," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Comparing Foreign Policies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1974), pp. 122–23.

16. Ivor Thomas, "War and its Causes, 1815–1914," in E. F. M. Durbin and George Catlin, eds., *War and Democracy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1938); Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (New York: Quadrangle/The N.Y. Times, 1960), p. 176.

17. William J. Coplin and J. Martin Rochester, "The Permanent Court of International Justice, the International Court of Justice, the League of Nations, and the United Nations," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (June 1972), 529–50.

18. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages* (New York: Viking Press, 1970), p. 255.

Labels like "authoritarian" and "democratic" are extremely broad terms, which may account for some of the divergences among the empirical findings just cited. To understand the impact of domestic political structures on foreign policy, it becomes necessary to examine those structures in more detail. This we will do by first looking at federal–unitary arrangements and then proceeding to a discussion of the relative contribution to decision making of various executive, legislative, and bureaucratic groups. The role of the military, political parties, interest groups, and public opinion will also be examined.

FEDERAL AND UNITARY STRUCTURES

Decision-making structures have varying degrees of centralization. A basic distinction, for example, has been made between unitary political structures, such as those established in most European states (with the exception of Switzerland), and federal systems, such as those found in Canada, the United States, Nigeria, and Australia. Although the Soviet Union is nominally a federal system, and in 1945 Stalin went so far as to modify the Soviet constitution by giving the sixteen individual republics control over their own foreign policy in the hope that the Soviet Union might obtain sixteen seats in the United Nations, it is clear that the making of Soviet foreign policy is heavily centralized. Stalin's ruse did have some positive reward for the Soviet Union, since it helped produce a compromise at Yalta in which the Soviets were awarded seats for the Ukraine and Byelorussia in addition to their own. Little more could have been expected, for President Franklin D. Roosevelt countered with a request for forty-eight seats for the United States.

In the area of national security policy, the unitary–federal distinction probably does not make much difference, since in both cases defense policy tends to be highly centralized, with the national government enjoying a monopoly on the use of force. Although the national government in the United States provides some recognition of the power of the states by allowing separate national guards for each, these units may be called up at the request of the national government at any time.

It is in the area of commercial and trade policy that the federal structure makes a real difference, as can be seen in Australia and Canada, where the provinces send their own representatives abroad to look after provincial economic interests. Individual American states and even cities have also begun to send trade missions abroad in recent years.

Pressures for provincial participation in foreign affairs will perhaps be greatest in federal systems in which ethnicity makes a critical difference. This is the case in Canada, with its French- and English-speaking provinces. Similarly, in the late 1960s the Ibo tribe of Nigeria attempted unsuccessfully to establish a separate state, Biafra. The federal divisions within Nigeria were so pervasive that the regional governments often made foreign-policy statements that contradicted the position of the central government. For example, in 1965 the northern regional premier declared that "the state of Israel does not exist," despite the fact that Israel had an embassy in Lagos, and in 1961 the eastern regional premier visited New Delhi and expressed support for an Afro-Asian bloc that was opposed by the central government.[19]

Federalism increases opportunities for manipulation of the internal affairs of the federal state. When President Charles de Gaulle visited the French-speaking province of Quebec in 1967 he made strong public statements favoring Quebecian separatism. The United States government also tried to take advantage of the federal system in Brazil while the leftist regime of João Goulart was in power by offering foreign aid directly to the governors of the states whose leaders happened to be political opponents of Goulart.[20]

THE EXECUTIVE

Whether the governmental decision-making process is authoritarian or democratic, federal or unitary, the executive branch of the government and, within it, the top decision maker—the president, prime minister, or chancellor—has assumed the primary role in the making of foreign policy. The superior position of the executive is particularly apparent in more authoritarian regimes, where the parliamentary body, if it exists at all, is reduced to the position of rubber-stamping decisions emanating from the executive rulers, as in the case of the Supreme Soviet in the Soviet Union, which meets for only a few days once a year. But even in more democratic polities a number of factors have intruded to provide the executive and within it its chief executive officer with increased power in the development and execution of foreign policy. Among these factors are:

1. The increased salience of international affairs and the atmosphere of almost perpetual crisis have increased the need for a more centralized foreign-policy process.
2. Improved communications and modern technology have allowed the highest-level decision makers to participate directly in the foreign-policy process through the use of summit meetings and direct communication links via telephone and satellite communication systems. Foreign diplomats have been reduced largely to serving as message carriers as basic policies are developed at higher levels.
3. The executive is able to assert a more prominent role in the conduct of foreign policy because of its superior informational channels. Political, military, and economic officers stationed around the globe report directly to their departmental chiefs in the executive branch. The ability of the legislative branch and other possible claimants to power to obtain independent information is highly circumscribed owing to the much smaller size of their staffs and resources.
4. It is easier for a unitary actor like the chief executive officer to initiate policy than it is for a collective body like a parliament to do so.
5. International problems affect many bureaucratic units, which are often of equal status. Since, in many cases, they cannot overrule each other, decisions tend to be pushed upward to be resolved at the highest executive levels.
6. Tradition has favored a strong executive in the conduct of foreign policy, since national populations habitually have not been very interested or knowledgeable about foreign-policy issues. As a result, parliamentary bodies, which represent those populations, have not been very assertive on foreign-policy issues. This situation may be changing, however, as it becomes more obvious how

19. Olajide Aluko, "Nigeria and Foreign Policy," in Olajide Aluko, ed., *The Foreign Policy of African States* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p. 181.

20. Annette Baker Fox, *The Politics of Attraction* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 186.

much foreign-policy decisions affect the economic well-being of a nation.

Among the various executives in the world, there is considerable variability in the way foreign-policy decisions are made. To a certain extent this might be a function of the particular person occupying the position of chief executive, since some leaders are more interested in foreign affairs than others. But it is also a function of the structure of the decision-making process, as can be seen by contrasting the presidential system of decision making with the parliamentary system.

There appears to be some difference of opinion as to whether the parliamentary system or the presidential system has the advantage in terms of providing a more consistent and coherent foreign policy. Some writers suggest that the presidential system, with its regularly scheduled elections, facilitates continuity of policy. The chief executive of a presidential system like the United States is guaranteed at least four years in office and need not worry about the whims of a parliament, which can vote the executive out of power at any time through a vote of no confidence. Nevertheless, several factors combine to aid the continuity of policy in the parliamentary system. The first of these is the existence of highly disciplined political parties. As long as the prime minister enjoys a parliamentary majority, he or she can count on continued support for executive policies and need not adjust them for want of funding or the refusal of the parliament to ratify and support those policies. Second, parliamentary systems tend to have greater bureaucratic continuity. In a parliamentary system only the cabinet minister tends to be replaced, while the civil servant, who basically runs the department, continues to play that role under a new cabinet head. In a presidential system like the United States, when the administration changes, several layers of each department tend to be replaced with political appointees, a fact that dictates against continuity of policy. It is also common for all ambassadors to submit their resignations when a new president takes office, and many are accommodated. Third, continuity of foreign policy is facilitated in a parliamentary system by the fact that prime ministers are selected only after long service within the major party. For the most part, only those who are capable and willing to reflect the consensus of the ruling party will be able to rise to the top. It would be highly improbable in a parliamentary system for a person to become prime minister by pursuing a campaign like the one conducted by Jimmy Carter in 1976, in which he ran

against the Washington establishment. The only exception might be during periods of extreme national emergency, as in the case of party renegade Winston Churchill's assumption of the office following the utter failure of Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy toward Hitler.

Despite these arguments in favor of parliamentary systems in terms of the continuity of foreign policy, the only empirical study that sheds some light on the subject concluded that during the period 1959–68 the least change in foreign policy between administrations occurred in presidential systems, followed by parliamentary systems, with the most change in policy arising when governments were changed by extralegal means.[21] It may be that the lower continuity score recorded for parliamentary systems is due to the fact that some of the parliamentary governments included in the analysis have been subject to frequent turnover, as in the case of postwar Italy, where the average life of a government has been less than a year.

In comparing Britain with the United States, Kenneth N. Waltz has concluded that the latter, with its presidential system, has certain advantages in developing a creative and adaptable foreign policy.[22] In the British system power is fused in the office of the prime minister and the prime minister's cabinet and party. Given this concentration of power, British governments have tended to avoid problems while seeking broad accommodation. The prime minister tends to be blamed for any failure of foreign policy, which could lead to loss of power through a vote of no confidence, whereas in the American system it is difficult to assess fault, since the American voter does not know which party to blame. The competitive structure between power centers in the American system has, according to Waltz, actually encouraged innovative zeal, vigorous leadership, and willingness to take risks. In contrast, British foreign policy has suffered from painfully slow adjustments to changing conditions, as well as a tendency to react only when a crisis has become severe. Whereas the British style in foreign policy has been one of obscuring issues rather than confronting them, as can be seen by British ambivalence toward the decline of empire and their attitudes toward Europe, the American response has been one of dramatizing differences and confronting problems directly in order to solve them.

21. David J. Rosen, "Leadership Change and Foreign Policy," paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Convention, Chicago, 1974.

22. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*, p. 304.

Whether speaking of a presidential or a parliamentary system, the consensus is that the legislative body plays a limited role in the making of foreign policy. Although there is some variation between nations, legislative bodies, at least in democratic societies, often share in the treaty-making process and approve foreign-policy appointments. They usually play an important role in the budgetary process and share in the ultimate decision to engage in war. The trend in most states, as noted earlier, is one of ever-increasing power to the executive at the expense of legislative and other groups.

The preeminent position of the executive branch over the legislative body can be seen most clearly in the United States, where most foreign policy initiatives have arisen within the executive. In an analysis of twenty-two major foreign policy decisions taken between 1930 and 1961, only three were found to have been initiated by Congress, and congressional influence was dominant relative to the executive in only six cases.[23]

The efforts by the United States Senate to help redress that imbalance with the passage of the War Powers Act in 1973 hardly change the situation, for the President still retains the power to use force without congressional approval, as he has done historically in more than one hundred instances. Should Congress disapprove of such use, it may exercise its power over the purse, but once troops are committed, this becomes less feasible.

To suggest that Congress has been systematically excluded by the executive from all foreign-policy arenas is not supported by the data. An examination of all nonclassified American foreign-policy commitments revealed that from 1946 to 1972 there were over six thousand international agreements; of these, 87 percent were statutory and another 6 percent involved treaties, which require senatorial approval. Only 7 percent of the total were in the form of executive agreements, which do not require congressional approval.[24]

Legislative bodies in parliamentary systems would seem to have less impact on foreign policy making than Congress, for in parliamentary systems power tends to be centralized in the hands of the cabinet. Parliamentary sessions in France and Britain, for example, have been little concerned with foreign-policy issues, which were

23. James A. Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making*, rev. ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 65.

24. Lock Johnson and James M. McCormick, "The Making of International Agreements," *Journal of Politics*, 40 (May 1978), 468–78.

found to constitute less than 5 percent of the debates in the French National Assembly and only about 5 percent of the parliamentary questions posed in the House of Commons.[25] Although in most instances the parliament enjoys the power to demand that the prime minister and his or her foreign-policy cabinet submit to question-and-answer periods, the effect of such activities is limited, particularly if the prime minister enjoys a firm majority. The leverage parliament does have over the executive lies largely in its power to issue a vote of no confidence, but this may result in the dissolution of parliament, forcing its members to run again for office, which they often are not eager to do. Foreign-policy crises have brought down governments in the past, but such changes have often been limited to members of the cabinet while the party alignment remained the same, as in the case of Churchill's replacement of Chamberlain after Munich, and Macmillan's assumption of power from Eden following the Suez crisis in 1956.

THE BUREAUCRACY

Apart from the chief executive and his or her immediate advisers, the executive branch of government is made up of a large number of bureaucrats, many of whom are involved in the making and implementation of foreign policy. Recently there has been great interest in the role such bureaucrats play in the foreign-policy process, as some experts see them as the major architects of foreign policy. Chief executives and their immediate advisers are usually transitory and, as a consequence, must rely heavily on the permanent bureaucracy for advice and cooperation in developing and implementing foreign policy. The bureaucracy has achieved the essential skills for dealing with foreign governments and must of necessity be deferred to in the conduct of such policy. Moreover, the bureaucracy collects the relevant information and makes decisions at each level as to what information and which issues will rise to the next level of decision making.

If expertise, experience, and control of information are not enough to give the bureaucracy a very important role in decision making, bureaucracies also become critical at yet another stage in the process—that of policy implementation. Policies do not implement

25. Simon Serfaty, *France, de Gaulle, and Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 80.

themselves; they must be executed by subordinates. Through strategies of procrastination, not listening to instructions, or even intentional sabotage, many policies remain dormant. The chief decision maker often becomes preoccupied with other issues and as a result fails to monitor adequately the activities of the subordinates charged with executing a given decision. The frustration of President Kennedy upon learning that the presidential order to withdraw missiles from Turkey had not been carried out is merely one example of a fairly common phenomenon. It is not enough simply to issue orders, as President Harry S. Truman noted with regard to his successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Truman was speculating on the problems the latter would probably have as President, given Eisenhower's previous experience as chief of staff of the Army, in which compliance with official orders is taken for granted.

Before evaluating the role of the bureaucracy in the making of foreign policy, it might be useful to examine some current trends with respect to that bureaucracy. The most obvious of these is the extensive increase in the size of the bureaucracy concerned with foreign-policy matters. This can be seen in the overwhelming increase in the number of advisers and analysts within the foreign office itself. In the 1870s Bismarck's foreign office had only four permanent officials, roughly the scale at which all foreign offices operated about the turn of the century.[26] As late as 1939 the entire State Department had a smaller staff than is found in a single large American embassy today. Foreign-policy personnel now number in the thousands and are located not only in the State Department but also in the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Treasury, Labor, and so forth. Even small, developing states have established fairly large foreign-policy bureaucracies. Kwame Nkrumah, for example, celebrated Ghana's independence by opening some seventy embassies, which required extensive staffing both at home and abroad.

A second major trend among foreign-policy bureaucracies has been the substantial increase in the size and significance of non-foreign-office bureaucracies which deal with foreign-policy issues. In some systems defense and economic ministries are challenging the preeminent position of the foreign minister in the making of foreign policy. With increased global economic interaction, economic well-being is no longer determined by activities within the nation, but is

26. Henry A. Kissinger, "Bureaucracy and Policymaking: The Effects of Insiders and Outsiders on the Policy Process," in Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, eds., *Readings in American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), p. 88.

very much affected by external economic activities. The power OPEC has to affect national economies throughout the world by manipulating the price of oil is but one illustration of the impact of external economic decisions. One can add governmental policies establishing tariffs, manipulating currency values, dumping products at cheaper prices abroad, and the like, all of which have serious repercussions for economic interests throughout the world. Consequently, in many countries experts on international issues are being added in large numbers in such departments as agriculture, treasury, commerce, and labor in an effort to look after their country's special interests. These experts also become involved in continuing negotiations abroad concerning a whole range of economic concerns. Many such experts are being assigned to overseas embassies on a permanent basis. It has been reported that some twenty-three American agencies are represented in the Tokyo Embassy alone.[27]

The growth in the foreign-policy role of defense ministries has been even more impressive. Traditionally, defense ministries have assumed critical roles in foreign policy during wars and international crises, but continuing national security concerns in the postwar world have increased both the power and size of defense establishments. Never before have military alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact persisted during peacetime to the extent that they have in the post-World War II period. Nor have standing armies been as pervasive as they are today. Given the continuing concern about national security issues and the tremendous resources available to defense departments, they are able to make themselves heard by decision makers on many foreign-policy matters.

A third general trend in bureaucratic decision making is that of increasing specialization. Contemporary foreign policies have become extremely complex, involving political, economic, technological, and cultural factors and hence requiring individuals with specialized skills. Although one still sees some generalists in foreign offices, the vast expansion of the foreign-policy bureaucracy has brought with it experts in issues involving much more than political and diplomatic affairs.

There are those who argue that the trend toward bureaucratization in foreign policy making has some positive aspects and can facilitate a more rational foreign policy. Some of these arguments have been summarized recently by Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf,

27. Eric Clark, *Corps Diplomatique* (London: Allen Lane, 1973), p. 63.

who make the following points in favor of bureaucratic decision making:

1. Administrative efficiency increases because of specialization, which facilitates the division of labor and provides expertise.
2. Bureaucracies are efficient because they are hierarchically structured.
3. Decision-making procedures are established for getting things done. Such procedures reduce the danger of capricious decision-making and facilitate consistency.
4. Bureaucracies keep records and provide a collective memory of past actions, making current problem-solving simpler and hopefully more rational.
5. Bureaucracies emphasize achievement rather than ascriptive criteria in selecting personnel.
6. Similarly, promotions usually are made on the basis of merit and performance.
7. The existence of many agencies in a bureaucratic structure encourages consideration of a wide range of alternatives.[28]

Certain negative aspects of bureaucratic decision making have also been noted by a number of writers, who argue that the existence of large bureaucracies tends to fragment foreign policy. With many different agencies involved, each with its standard ways of doing things as well as its jealousy and suspicion of outsiders, a coherent policy becomes difficult to achieve. Since foreign-policy issues affect many agencies, decision making is likely to proceed at a snail's pace if all relevant agencies are provided with the opportunity to "sign off" on a given report or decision. Failure to consult all the appropriate agencies, on the other hand, can sometimes lead to disastrous results, particularly if such an agency has critical information or can make a difference in the implementation of policy.

The existence of several layers of decision making also means that information relevant to rational decision making can be scattered among many agencies, making a reconstruction of the broader picture almost impossible. Had the various pieces of information relevant to

28. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 339–40.

the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941 been available and coordinated in a single place, that intelligence failure might well have been averted.

Fragmented bureaucratic decision-making structures may also affect how other states relate to a given nation. There often seems to be a preference for dealing with governments that are more centralized, for it adds to the predictability and the speed with which a given transaction can be executed. At the same time, fragmentation can enable external actors to gain bureaucratic allies to influence a given nation's policy or perhaps even to counter a decision that has already been made. Lobbying across national borders often involves bureaucratic-to-bureaucratic interaction in an effort to influence one's own foreign policy as well as that of the other state. For example, American bureaucrats within the Department of Agriculture regularly negotiate levels of grain exports with their counterparts in other countries rather than going through diplomatic channels.[29]

Another problem of bureaucratic decision making that concerns some observers is the fact that the narrow interests of an agency may be substituted for the broader national interest. Agencies are more concerned with their own special interests and tend to view problems only from that narrow perspective. Policies that will contribute to the budgetary prowess and role of the bureau are likely to be favored. Indeed, there will often be considerable mutual back-scratching, as in military budgetary requests, when each service agrees either tacitly or formally not to challenge the pet weapons systems of the other in the expectation that its own projects will not be questioned. Obtaining unbiased recommendations becomes difficult for the central decision maker who is forced to rely on such advice in making foreign-policy choices.

Concern about individual career interests is a problem in any bureaucracy. Such concerns place pressure on the individual not to rock the boat or object to the position of a superior if he or she wants to advance within the bureaucratic structures. Bureaucrats frequently move slowly in uncharted territory until they are able to see which way the wind is blowing. In a much-cited study of the State Department, Chris Argyis has found the department afflicted by too much bureaucratic self-protection, which causes its members to avoid

29. Raymond F. Hopkins, "Global Management Networks: The Internationalization of Domestic Bureaucracy," *International Social Science Journal*, 30 (1978), 37.

creative initiatives that might provoke opposition and controversy.[30]

While he was a professor at Harvard University, Henry A. Kissinger wrote articles that were extremely critical of the role of the bureaucracy in the making of foreign policy. He argued that because of the pervasive bureaucratization of American society, leaders have been socialized in the direction of insecurity and orthodoxy, precluding creative responses to the demands of foreign policy.[31] Moreover, he suggested that, owing to the tremendous energy required to prevail in bureaucratic politics, once a decision has been made, flexibility in international affairs is diminished because of the reluctance to hazard a hard-won domestic consensus.

Kissinger's disillusionment with the bureaucracy was shared by his boss, President Nixon, who hired Kissinger first as his national security adviser and then as secretary of state. In the former role Kissinger effectively neutralized the bureaucracy by requiring that all decisions ultimately go through an enlarged National Security Council, which he directed. In turn, Kissinger presented the options directly to Nixon in daily morning meetings, allowing the latter to choose between carefully structured alternatives.

Similar efforts to make the executive less dependent on career bureaucrats can be found in Britain, where the foreign-policy staff of the prime minister's office has been increased substantially as both Labor and Conservative party officials have criticized the imperviousness of the Foreign Office to political direction. Efforts to minimize the role of the foreign-policy bureaucracy can also be seen in developing countries, as is shown in Kwame Nkrumah's efforts during the 1960s to assume the role of sole initiator of foreign policy because of his overwhelming distrust of the bureaucracy.[32] Concern about the role of the bureaucracy in policy making is not limited to the modern age. An eighteenth-century czar suggested that not he but, rather, ten thousand clerks ruled Russia.

Some of the criticism leveled at bureaucratic decision making is really directed at the issue of decision making by committee. Rational and strategic choice becomes particularly difficult when decisions are

30. Chris Argyis, *Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness Within the Department of State*, Department of State Publication 8180 (Washington, D.C., January 1967).

31. Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," in Henry A. Kissinger, ed., *American Foreign Policy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), pp. 11–43.

32. P. J. Boyce, *Foreign Affairs for New States* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p.

subjected to endless rounds of discussion by committees both within and between various agencies concerned with the making of foreign policy. William Wallace noted the problem with respect to decision making in Britain when he wrote that "extensive use of interdepartmental committees in which civil servants must arrive at a compromise position means that proposals too often lose their bite long before they reach their final form."[33]

Others have objected to committee decision making on the grounds that it reduces individual responsibility and stifles imagination owing to the unending need to compromise. Irving L. Janis has criticized small-group decision making at the highest policy levels for what he views as the tendency to develop "groupthink."[34] After surveying what he considered to be policy failures in such cases as the Bay of Pigs, Korea, and Pearl Harbor, Janis suggested that within each small group making the relevant decisions were "a number of socio-psychological factors which impeded independent critical thinking, resulting in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against outgroups." Among the symptoms of "groupthink" noted by Janis are the following:

1. An illusion of group invulnerability, which creates excessive optimism and encourages the taking of extreme risks.
2. Collective rationalization to discount warnings that might lead the group to reconsider its assumptions.
3. An unquestioned belief in the group's inherent morality, causing its members to neglect the moral consequences of their acts.
4. Stereotyping of the enemy as evil, weak, or stupid.
5. Pressure against any member who challenges the stereotypes or assumptions of the group.
6. Self-censorship of deviations from apparent group consensus.
7. A shared illusion of unanimity among group members (silence is often viewed as approval).
8. The emergence of self-appointed "mindguards," who seek to make certain that others in the group do not deviate from the established norms and consensus.

33. William Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1975), p. 77.

34. Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1972).

Janis goes on to argue that these processes are at work not only in authoritarian regimes but in democratic ones as well. Indeed, the greatest risk is seen as arising when the members of a small decision-making group are highly amicable and enjoy high esprit de corps, as each reassures the others that a given course of action is desirable and that no further questions need be asked.

Although there are plausible arguments both supporting and detracting from the utility of bureaucracy in the making of effective and rational foreign policy, the critical issue from the standpoint of foreign-policy determinants remains that of the explanatory accuracy of the bureaucratic model. Several authorities have argued that bureaucracies are not the major architects of foreign policy in most nation-states, and the mere increase in the size and activities of bureaucracies is hardly proof of their impact on final choices. It might be noted that a number of those who subscribe to the bureaucratic model have been involved in governmental politics and as a result follow the natural inclination to view their own role as perhaps more significant than in fact it was. It is somewhat reminiscent of Francis Bacon's fly, which sat on the axletree of the chariot wheel and declared, "What a dust do I raise."

The case studies that have been developed to indicate bureaucratic politics at work tend to focus on issues that have the bureaucracy exercised, neglecting those that enjoy broader consensus or those that are decided at higher levels without much bureaucratic input. By selecting such cases one can document a great deal of bureaucratic bargaining and maneuvering. Whether such activities influenced or determined the final foreign-policy output cannot be ascertained from an analysis of bureaucratic infighting.

The chief decision maker usually has the power to select his or her immediate advisers and to determine which advice will be accepted. The natural tendency is to listen to that advice which will confirm the decision maker's own predispositions. Advisers themselves have a vested interest in providing the kind of information and advice that they believe their boss desires.

The latitude of the chief executive tends to be somewhat less constrained by domestic actors when it comes to foreign policy than in the case of domestic policy. Foreign policy has a less interested public, fewer interest groups, and some decided advantages for the executive in terms of access to and control of the flow of information. The interest of the chief executive in foreign-policy matters will, of course, have a

critical impact on the role bureaucratic politics is able to play in foreign policy, being somewhat less important when executive interest is high.

Just as bureaucratic politics may not be the most accurate model for policy planning and decision making, it may not be that critical at the implementation stage, as is sometimes argued. At least one should not assume that any failure in implementation of foreign policy is in itself indicative of bureaucratic politics at work. Bureaucratic inertia or failure to act may be related only to confusion over values that divide the broader society as well as its top leadership. It may be that the chief executive is not interested in seeing a given decision fully implemented, but for either domestic or international reasons may desire to give the impression that something is being done about a given problem.

Since the bureaucratic model is of necessity based largely on anecdotal case studies, there is little systematic empirical research available to help one assess the relative role of the bureaucracy in the making of foreign policy. One of the few such studies that correlates bureaucratic characteristics with foreign-policy behavior as measured by the activities of some thirty-two states during the period 1966–69 concluded that attributes of bureaucracies exert only a modest impact on external conduct.[35] In this study the size of the bureaucracy failed to account for the variation in foreign-policy output, although its age and degree of institutionalization did make some difference in terms of continuity and inertia as younger and less institutionalized bureaucracies tended to demonstrate greater discontinuity and innovation in their foreign policies.

In the empirical study by Russett and Monsen cited in our discussion of open and closed polities, the size of the bureaucracy was found to make some difference in foreign-policy output.[36] In fact, the finding that larger bureaucratic regimes appeared more willing to engage in war than less bureaucratized ones proved to be the only statistically significant finding in the study. Even here one must ask whether this is due to the size of the bureaucracy or to the size of the state, since larger states tend to have larger bureaucracies than smaller ones.

35. Linda P. Brady and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "Bureaucratic Determinants of Foreign Policy Behavior: An Events Data Test of the Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 1975.

36. Russett and Monsen, "Bureaucracy and Polyarchy as Predictors of Performance."

THE MILITARY

Among bureaucratic groups, special attention needs to be paid to the role of the military in the making of foreign policy. As international conflict becomes more ubiquitous and national security is seen as a more critical issue, one might expect to see the military assuming a more prominent role in such policy. Since the military controls the primary means of coercion in a society, it is able in many instances to determine who will rule. One study, focusing on the less developed countries, counted some 128 successful military coups during the period 1945–75. Of the 78 nations surveyed, only 22 had not experienced a coup.[37] Moreover, four countries accounted for 21 percent of the total: Syria had experienced 11 coups; Bolivia, 7; Dahomey, 6; and Haiti, 5. The military coup, however, is not limited to the postwar period; some 115 successful military changes of government occurred in Latin America alone during the nineteenth century.[38]

The role of the military in the making of foreign policy depends on the state's form of government. To illustrate this point, let us examine the patterns of civil–military relations as they occur in a military oligarchy, a totalitarian state, and a democratic society. Illustrations of the military oligarchy are most prevalent among third world nations, as one might guess by the large number of military coups occurring in such nations. But even when the military is in control, it frequently has to rely on civilian expertise; the military leadership often turns to political parties and bureaucrats to fill roles in which it lacks expertise.[39]

One factor that has enhanced the role of the military in many developing countries has been military training and assistance by the United States. Important organizational skills are derived from such training, along with military resources that increase the prospects of political control. It has even been suggested that Mexico has remained more aloof from the United States than many other Latin American

37. Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 51.

38. Claude E. Welch, Jr., "Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality," in Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), p. 17.

39. Henry Bienen and David Morell, "Transition from Military Rule: Thailand's Experience," in Catherine M. Kelleher, ed., *Political-Military Systems* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 19.

states for fear that alliance or cooperation with the United States would threaten civilian rule in that country.[40]

The existence of military oligarchies may affect relations with other countries, as one might expect military oligarchies to relate better to each other than to civilian regimes. However, the United States, for one, has often had more cordial relations with military regimes in the third world than with civilian governments. Official American relations with Brazil have tended to improve when the military was in the ascendance rather than when leftist regimes like those of Quadros and Goulart were in power.[41] Business interests in the United States have also preferred to deal with centralized military regimes, for they are more predictable and stable.

Civil–military relations are perhaps most sensitive in totalitarian regimes. Since the governments of such states rely heavily on force and terror to control their populations, such governments need to be concerned that this force not be used against themselves. Whenever a national emergency requires that the military assume a preeminent position, considerable effort will be made to place the military under civilian control or, at a minimum, to reduce its power once the crisis has passed. In the Soviet Union, political commissars have on occasion been appointed to oversee military units, most often to the detriment of an effective fighting unit. In the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong found it necessary to bring in the military to check the excesses of the Red Guard during the Great Cultural Revolution of 1966–69. This provided the People's Liberation Army (PLA) with increased power, which was subsequently diminished after a suspicious air crash resulted in the death of PLA leader Lin Biao in 1971. By 1974 the Chinese Communist party had regained its pre-Cultural Revolution primacy. Despite the bureaucratic ascendancy of the military during and immediately after the Great Cultural Revolution, there was no major change in Chinese foreign policy "that correlated in any discernible way with changes in the bureaucratic balance of power."[42]

Some observers have assumed that the rapid military progress made by the Soviet Union in recent years, to the point where it now

40. Fox, *The Politics of Attraction*, p. 71.

41. Ibid.

42. Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculation of Deterrence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), p. 226.

equals (or, it is sometimes claimed, surpasses) American strategic capability, is indicative of the vast increase in the influence of the Soviet military. Analysts also have noted the promotion of Marshal Andrei Grechko to full Politburo membership in 1973 as further evidence of the increasing power of the military. Although Marshal Georgi Zhukov held a similar position briefly in 1957, his appointment seemed designed to exploit the popularity of a retired military officer rather than to give any real power to the military. As a pressure group, however, the military may be in a less advantageous position in a totalitarian state than in a democracy in terms of ability to influence governmental policy. This is so because of the lack of opportunity in the former to develop outside constituencies composed of economic interest groups or the public.

To assert that the recent militancy of the Soviet Union is a result of the increased political power of the military may not be entirely accurate. Such policies would, at a minimum, require the acquiescence of the top party leadership. It may be that there is little difference of opinion between the military and party hierarchies on national security issues. The military leadership, after all, is coopted by the party leadership and serves at its pleasure. It is therefore likely to mirror the policy preferences of the latter. Extensive investigations using content analysis have shown that "there are no essential differences between the political comments of the military and civilian politicians."[43]

After reviewing a number of foreign-policy decisions, Malcom Mackintosh concluded that when a foreign policy adopted by the leadership coincided with the views of the military, it was difficult to distinguish whether the policy was initiated by the party or the military, and that when their views differed, there was nothing to suggest any diminution of the party's primacy in foreign policy.[44] It has also been noted that to the extent that there is division between the military and civilian viewpoints, it is largely intrainstitutional, with the lower levels of the bureaucracy opposing the higher levels.[45]

43. Egbert Jahn, "Four Approaches to the Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Egbert Jahn, ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy: Its Social and Economic Conditions* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 21.

44. Malcom MacKintosh, "The Soviet Military: Influence on Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism*, 22 (September-October 1973), 10–11.

45. William E. Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds., *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 35–36.

The democratic regime is concerned primarily with retaining civilian control over the military. In the United States the President is the commander-in-chief. President Lincoln was very much within his constitutional authority when he dismissed General McClellan during the Civil War, just as Truman was in firing MacArthur almost a century later. Other democratic governments have had military challenges on occasion, as in the case of a 1944 crisis in Canada during which members of the High Command came close to resigning rather than accept the policy of the government.

In Germany and Japan the military appears to be limited in its ability to influence foreign policy, despite its previous high standing in those societies. Part of this is due to the disillusionment produced by defeat and destruction during World War II. As these experiences become more remote, public opinion appears to be less condemnatory. Nevertheless, both states are still restricted in terms of their military policy, as Germany may not produce nuclear or chemical and biological weapons and Japan is limited from developing an offensive military capability by Article 9 of its American-dictated constitution.

Civilian control of the military in democratic societies is guaranteed largely by tradition. Structural lines of authority generally place military leaders under civilian defense ministries. The fact that there are several services, often competing with each other for resources and with conflicting views of the world, also provides security for the civilian regime, which would be most vulnerable to a unified military command that was vehemently opposed to its policies.

It appears that when intense conflict arises between civilian and military decision makers, the latter tend to prevail. An analysis of sixty-two such cases involving France, Germany, Japan, and the United States from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century revealed that the outcome tended to favor the military.[46] Moreover, control by the military was greater in situations in which mass public participation was restricted.

Although civilian rule has predominated in democratic polities and is likely to continue to do so, some observers, such as Harold Lasswell, have been concerned about the threat of the rise of a garrison

46. Richard W. Benjamin and Lewis J. Edinger, "Conditions for Military Control over Foreign Policy Decisions in Major States," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 15 (March 1971), 5–31.

state.[47] The danger is that as appeals to national security are made in an age of world insecurity, which has certainly been characteristic of the post-1945 era, major nations will become less democratic and more militaristic in their value orientation. The United States suffered through the communist witch hunts of the McCarthy period in the 1950s, and the Soviet Union's incursion into Afghanistan may lead to similar paranoid thinking in the 1980s.

Regimes in which the military is prominent tend to be fairly conservative and unwilling to take risks in foreign-policy matters. The military is very aware of what death and destruction mean. It also is hesitant to use its most sophisticated weaponry, recognizing that such use will lead to the destruction of extremely high-priced weapons. The expensive dreadnoughts built in the early 1900s became largely showpieces of the state of the art in shipbuilding—few politicians or military officers wanted to risk their destruction.

It may be inappropriate to regard the military as any more militant than any other group in a given society, for its personnel usually reflect the broader society from which they are drawn. In the modern military, large numbers of recruits are involved in jobs that are not strictly military and have civilian counterparts, such as engineer, clerk, and cook. In the mid-nineteenth century only about 10 percent of the specialties within the military had civilian equivalents, but today this figure may well be approaching 80 percent.[48] In China the People's Liberation Army actually performs a number of civilian tasks involving agricultural production, mass mobilization efforts, and various administrative responsibilities.

Support for high defense spending is not limited to military interests; economic interests and the public have also pressed for higher military budgets, as will be shown in Chapter 6 when we discuss the role played by the military-industrial complex. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that military regimes tend to spend more for defense than civilian regimes. A quantitative study of Latin American regimes covering the period 1950–67 found that civilian regimes generally spent less for defense and more on welfare than military regimes.[49] The

47. Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State," *American Journal of Sociology*, 46 (January 1941), 455–68.

48. Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," p. 35.

49. Phil C. Schmitter, "Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness and Public Policy in Latin America, 1950–67," in Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn, eds., *On Military Intervention*, (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971), p. 454.

tendency for military regimes to spend more on defense was also confirmed in a global examination of some 150 countries conducted by Tong-Whan Park and Faris Abolfathi circa 1970.[50] Health and education budgets were found to have decreased as military influence increased.

Although military regimes may budget more for military efforts, they have not engaged in extensive international conflict, at least in Latin America. One authority noted that during the present century, apart from the Salvador–Honduras football war, the Chaco War, and the Leticia border dispute between Peru and Colombia, there have not been any serious military confrontations between states within the region.[51] It has even been suggested that the large number of Latin American military coups may have been due to the existence of a fairly benign international environment in which the military is confined to dull, repetitious garrison duty. Involvement in external wars might have kept the armed forces out of the domestic arena, whereas enforced idleness led them to engage in domestic plotting.[52]

POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS

Nongovernmental groups may also affect foreign-policy choices, although their distance from the central decision makers tends to mute their impact. Perhaps the most important of these are political parties and interest groups, which are formed to aggregate and articulate the interests of the broader society. In the area of foreign policy, their impact is likely to be less than that of the executive and its bureaucracy. Looking first at political parties, we find that their structures and functions vary widely from one polity to another. The party plays a particularly significant role in authoritarian regimes, which usually are organized around a one-party system. In the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, one's position in the Communist party is more important than one's governmental role. At various times in Soviet history, the person occupying the highest position in the

50. Cited in Sam Sarkesian, "A Political Perspective on Military Power in Developing Areas," in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., *The Military and Security in the Third World*, (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1978), p. 9.

51. Edy Kaufman, "Latin America," in Christopher Clapham, ed., *Foreign Policy Making in Developing States* (Westmead, England: Saxon House, 1977), p. 135.

52. Welch, "Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality," p. 26.

party's presidium has not held the chief governmental position, that of prime minister. Instead, these roles have been separated, as they were between Khrushchev and Bulganin and Brezhnev and Kosygin, with the latter member of each pair serving as prime minister.

A number of less developed states are also structured around a one-party system. Abdul Nasser, the former president of Egypt, objected to the creation of a multiparty system out of fear that it would involve a continual struggle between parties supported by outside nations.[53] But parties in less developed states, even states dominated by a single-party system, tend to be weak and ineffectual. Charismatic leaders or military oligarchies are more likely to provide what ever stability is obtainable. A smoothly functioning competitive political party system is a rarity among third world states and, as a result, can hardly be viewed as a major factor in foreign policy.

Among democratic polities, one might suggest that the larger the legislative majority enjoyed by a political party, the more likely it is to have an impact on foreign policy. Since 1951 foreign policy in Japan has been dominated for the most part by the Liberal-Democratic party (LDP), which was able to force ratification of the renewal of the security treaty with the United States in 1960 while the opposition parties were absent from the Diet. Japan does suffer from considerable factionalism within the LDP, and the majority position of the Liberal Democrats in the Diet is no longer taken for granted.

Parties within a multiparty system, which by definition consists of a number of small parties, tend to have less of an impact on foreign policy. Because of ever-changing coalitions, both governments and parties often have some difficulty ruling, and the bureaucracy is more likely to assume an important role in such a system. Nevertheless, during the Fourth Republic of France, despite rotating governments some semblance of stability in foreign policy was achieved because Robert Schuman was able to retain the position of foreign minister during several successive governments.

In the United States the leverage of political parties in the foreign policy area has been limited by their extreme decentralization. The leadership seems incapable of controlling its membership. Even with large majorities of his own party members in Congress, President Carter found it difficult to generate support for a number of foreign-policy

53. Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 127.

programs. Liberals and conservatives on foreign-policy issues are found in both political parties in the United States.

The lack of polarization on foreign-policy issues among American political parties helps explain why there are few dramatic shifts in foreign policy when one party replaces another in Congress. American foreign policy has been remarkably consistent over the entire postwar period, despite party platforms that threaten change. Although the Republican party pressed for liberation of Eastern Europe in the early 1950s, in 1956, when the opportunity arose to support the rebellious, anti-Soviet Nagy government in Hungary, the Eisenhower administration failed to act.

Even in polities with more differentiated political parties, changes often are not as drastic as predicted. Britain's Labor party campaigned vigorously on an anti-Common Market platform, but its position changed after its leaders gained office. Failure to deliver on promises is related to the fact that there are a number of international constraints that limit foreign-policy choices, as will be shown in Chapter 8.

Another nongovernmental group that can influence foreign policy, but seems to have even less of an impact than political parties, is the interest group. Although an interest group may sometimes take on the characteristics of a political party by running its own candidates, as various agricultural and business groups have done, especially in multiparty states, more often their activities are limited to attempting to influence the foreign-policy process by lobbying before executive and legislative groups and engaging in information campaigns among the mass public.

Various types of interest groups are involved in lobbying activities on foreign-policy issues. Economic interest groups, such as those representing labor, business, and agriculture, are especially concerned about trade and tariffs; ethnic groups may become concerned about relations with countries whose people share the same ethnic background; and some groups may even be organized explicitly to affect foreign-policy choices—examples are World Federalists, Associations for the United Nations, and human rights organizations.

The impact of interest groups on foreign-policy decision making is extremely limited, since such groups have no authoritative position in the foreign-policy process. They must be able to persuade government officials of the appropriateness of their viewpoints. This is often difficult to do, particularly with respect to general political and mili-

tary policy, for interest groups cannot demonstrate that they as a group have an overriding interest in an issue apart from that of the nation as a whole. Even where an overriding interest can be shown, as in the case of economic interest groups and tariff policy, their power may be diluted because not all economic interest groups view the issues in the same way. Some favor freer trade, whereas others may prefer protectionism, depending on their specific competitive circumstances.

Among the more salient interest groups affecting foreign policy are those that have special links to foreign nations through a common ethnicity or ideology; they form what has been called a *linkage group* between nations that may facilitate reciprocal influence. Linkage groups have been known to influence governments in the direction of the policy preferred by the foreign government with which a group identifies. One study based on the voting behavior of twenty-five African states in the United Nations found a statistically significant relationship between states with highly active communist groups and their similarity to Soviet voting behavior.[54] Foreign-policy decisions may be made explicitly to placate domestic linkage groups, as in the case of the Malaysian government's decision to recognize the People's Republic of China in order to obtain the support of the large numbers of Malaysian Chinese who favored such an action.[55] Politicians in the United States have often sought domestic political support from Eastern European refugees by endorsing Captive Nations Week. Speeches favoring a united Ireland or opposing Fidel Castro can be expected to gain support among Irish and Cuban voters, respectively. More often than not, such ethnic groups have been exploited by politicians for their own ends rather than being able to manipulate the political process themselves.

Although linkage groups may be exploited for political purposes, their existence may create some problems both domestically and internationally. The large number of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia places serious strains on relations between those nations and the People's Republic of China. Similarly, India has been concerned about Pakistan's ability to influence the millions of Muslims residing within Indian borders, and the Philippines has been sensitive to the encouragement and aid provided by Islamic states to Philippine Muslim

54. Dan C. Heldman, "Soviet Relations with the Developing States: An Application of Correlation Analysis," in Roger E. Kanet, ed., *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies* (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 339–63.

55. Michael Leifer, "South-East Asia," in Clapham, *Foreign Policy Making in Developing States*, p. 30.

minorities in support of the latter's revolutionary goals. Suspicion is likely to be aroused, however, regardless of whether or not the linkage state does anything to encourage its linkage groups, and in order to reassure another state it might be necessary actively to discourage linkage groups located in foreign countries.

Interest groups have an impact only on issues that are allowed to gestate over time. As a result, their role during crises is considerably limited. One of the more interesting illustrations of pressure groups attempting to influence a foreign-policy issue involved efforts to obtain a favorable Senate vote in support of ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Dozens of pro-SALT interest groups were organized under the rubric of Americans for SALT. Opposing the treaty were groups like the Committee on the Present Danger and the National Strategy Information Center. Extensive lobbying among senators and their staffs, as well as elaborate public information campaigns, were organized both for and against the treaty.

The flow of information and pressure, however, was not unidirectional. The White House, aided by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the State Department, provided considerable assistance to the public education efforts of the pro-SALT groups. Literature, spokespersons, mailing lists, and the like were shared with these groups in an effort to gain public acceptance for the treaty. All such efforts were to little avail, however, for the treaty was never brought up for a vote.

Generally, interest groups cannot compete effectively against governmental groups, for the latter have the advantage of authoritative information. Governmental officials can determine which information and how much of it will be made available to the public. As a result, it is more likely that the government will be able to manipulate and influence the interest group than the reverse. On the whole, interest groups have had a limited impact on foreign policy even in democratic polities, but since such groups are at least organized, it might be suggested that they have a greater impact on foreign policy than the mass public, to which we now turn our attention.

PUBLIC OPINION

One of the criticisms of democratic foreign-policy decision making noted earlier is the notion that an uninformed public has too much influence on foreign-policy matters, which results in unwise

decisions. Although research on the precise linkage between public opinion and foreign policy is limited, as most such research surveys only public attitudes toward various international issues, we can make some generalizations about the role of public opinion. Among these are the following:

1. The mass public is generally ill informed and uninterested in foreign-policy matters.

The consensus of experts is fairly high regarding the general lack of knowledge about international affairs among the mass public, which is generally viewed as consisting of 75 to 90 percent of the adult population even in an advanced state like the United States. To illustrate the basically ill-informed quality of the American public, a survey conducted in the late spring of 1964 found that 25 percent of the population was unaware that China was ruled by a communist government and a like number was not even cognizant of the fact that the United States was fighting in Vietnam at the time.[56] Readership of world news stories tends to be limited among the mass public, and with respect to news, domestic affairs tend to receive the most attention. Hadley Cantril has reported that even at the height of World War II the public's interest in domestic affairs was almost twice as intense as its interest in foreign affairs.[57]

This lack of information and interest is not confined to the American public by any means. A 1967 survey conducted in Japan, which has one of the world's highest literacy rates and newspaper readerships, showed that one out of three respondents did not know about the existence of a communist government in China, while only half knew that China at the time had no diplomatic relations with Japan and that China was not a member of the United Nations at the time.[58] Interest in international affairs also appears to be limited, as another study found 27.1 percent of the West Germans "very interested in international affairs" as compared to 16.9 percent of the English, 11.9 percent of the French, 8.7 percent of the Japanese, and 4.4 percent of the Italians.[59]

56. Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, *The Political Beliefs of Americans* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 59.

57. Cited in Ralph B. Levering, *The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918–78* (New York: William Morrow, 1978), p. 32.

58. Chae-Jin Lee, *Japan Faces China* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1976), p. 9.

59. Daniel H. Willich, "Public Interest in International Affairs," *Social Science Quarterly*, 50 (September 1969), 274.

2. Decision makers have considerable latitude in the making of foreign policy.

Empirical studies of the impact of public opinion on foreign policy, albeit few and based primarily on data from the United States, appear to be in agreement that decision makers have a considerable degree of latitude within which to operate. A cross-national study by Martin Abravanel and Barry B. Hughes concluded that in the short run, "changes in attitudes and shifts in policy are correlated at a relatively low level. And to the degree that a short-term relationship can be found, it is the public that responds to governmental action rather than vice versa."[60] This was particularly true for France and Great Britain, where the relationship between foreign-policy changes and subsequent changes in public opinion showed positive correlations of .47 and .41, respectively. The results were not significant for West Germany and Italy, which lack long-term democratic traditions. The pattern for the United States has tended to follow that of Britain and France.

The latitude of decision makers is especially high in times of crisis, since the public tends to rally around the flag at such times. Presidential popularity appears to peak with crises whether governmental policies are effective or not. Kennedy's popularity rose from 61 to 74 percent after the Cuban missile crisis, but it stood at an even higher 85 percent following the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961; Truman had an impressive 81 percent of the public supporting his commitment to South Korea in 1950, despite his low popularity at the time, and Nixon's escalation of the Vietnam War in 1972 also enhanced his public support despite the increasing opposition to that war.[61] But the most dramatic rise in presidential support occurred in response to the Iranian seizure of the United States Embassy in Teheran in November 1979. As a result of the crisis, President Carter's popularity rating rose from 32 to 61 percent in one month—the most dramatic turnaround in a President's rating since Gallup polling began in the late 1930s.

Public-opinion polls have generally shown that the American public favors an active role in foreign policy, despite periodic frus-

60. Martin Abravanel and Barry B. Hughes, "The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Governmental Foreign Policy: A Cross-National Study," in Patrick J. McGowan, ed., *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies*, vol. 1 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 126.

61. Barry B. Hughes, *The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1978), pp. 38–39.

trations like Korea and Vietnam. Some 60 to 80 percent of the respondents in public-opinion polls conducted from 1949 through 1969 have favored an active role for American foreign policy. Even after the disaster in Vietnam, the figure still remained at 66 percent of the respondents surveyed in 1974.[62] With such a high level of support, few decision makers need to be concerned about taking decisive action in foreign affairs. Public opinion seems to be far from the millstone around the necks of decision makers portrayed by Walter Lippmann; it is more likely to be highly supportive.

If there is a lack of congruence between governmental preferences and public opinion, it is generally the former that tend to prevail. According to studies by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, United States legislators appear not to be overly responsive to public preferences, particularly in the foreign-policy area.[63] The 1978 Senate vote on the Panama Canal Treaties, which call for eventual reversion of the canal to Panama, is indicative of congressional efforts to place perceived national interests above constituency interest. Similarly, interviews conducted among State Department officials have documented how little such officials perceive themselves to be influenced by public opinion.[64] Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk made it clear to his subordinates that he did not want them to take domestic opinion into account in making their decisions.

If public opinion has had a minimal impact on American foreign policy, it seems to have had even less effect on the foreign policies of other democratic states. Donald C. Hellmann writes that decision makers in Japan "have paid little attention to public opinion on major foreign-policy issues."[65] Despite overwhelming opposition in the press and among the public to the United States–Japanese Security Treaty of 1960, in which some ten million persons signed a petition opposing the treaty, the Japanese Diet supported its ratification. Absent from that vote as a result of their boycott of the Diet, however, were all of the members of Japan's second-largest party, the Japanese Socialist party. Similarly, Kenneth Younger, who has served as minister of state for

62. Ibid., p. 31.

63. Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (March 1963), 45–56.

64. Bernard C. Cohen, *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 58–70.

65. Donald C. Hellmann, *Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 15.

foreign affairs in the United Kingdom, has written that he could think of no occasion when he or his superiors "had been greatly affected by public opinion in reaching important decisions."[66] Public opinion in Britain was overwhelmingly against British membership in the Common Market, yet the government still chose to join, and despite strong public opposition to *Ost-Politik*, the Brandt government proceeded toward normalizing West German relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Although mass public opinion can hardly be viewed as a significant input into the foreign policy of authoritarian states, considerable energy is expended in such states to educate—or, perhaps more accurately, indoctrinate—the mass public on foreign-policy issues. Mao Zedong was particularly anxious to make foreign relations part of the daily life of the Chinese citizen through the use of slogans, propaganda campaigns, and mass demonstrations. In fact, the *People's Daily* devotes a higher percentage of space to foreign affairs than any other mass circulation newspaper in the world.[67]

In developing states the role of public opinion in the foreign-policy process has also been limited. This is partially due to the seriously uniformed nature of the public and the high level of illiteracy in such polities. It probably also has something to do with a general lack of concern about such issues among the mass public, whose loyalties and identifications are more likely to be directed toward the local level and who are more concerned about survival than grand politics. This general lack of knowledge and interest on the part of the public has meant, for example, that political parties in Latin America seldom campaign or pursue consistent positions on international issues, and the same can be said for most African and Asian polities.

Despite considerable evidence that the general public exerts very little influence on daily foreign-policy decisions, there is still a pervasive belief that public opinion sets general limits beyond which decision makers may not go. The refusal of the United States to intervene in Vietnam after the French defeat at Diem Bien Phu in 1954 was strongly influenced by public concern about becoming involved in a major land war in Asia, particularly after the recent bitter experience of Korea. Similarly, the frustration surrounding the Vietnam fiasco made Con-

66. Cited in Leon D. Epstein, "British Foreign Policy," in Roy C. Macridis, ed., *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 53.

67. Allen S. Whiting and Robert F. Dernberger, *China's Future: Foreign Policy and Economic Development in the Post-Mao Era* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), p. 40.

gress and the American public reticent to support American involvement in the Angolan crisis in 1975, despite the urgings of President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger. The public's mood appears to change over time, however, as such unpopular events become more remote.

3. Public opinion is easily manipulable.

Those who are concerned about public opinion swinging widely and adventuristically and thus affecting foreign policy adversely might find some solace in the fact that mass opinion is easily manipulated and can be marshaled to serve the interests of those in power even in the most democratic of polities. This position has been cogently argued in William Lederer's *Nation of Sheep*, which outlines a number of reasons why the democratic press tends to report what the national elites desire.[68] Among these are the desire of reporters to retain access to their sources of information, which may be possible only if they report stories that are favorable to government officials; reliance on official press releases owing to lack of time or resources to investigate a story in person; the sparse geographic distribution of reporters throughout the world, so that one reporter often covers several countries; and the fact that much information about foreign-policy issues is classified.

It may well be that the ability to manipulate public opinion is greater in a democratic polity than in an authoritarian polity because defense mechanisms have been built up in the latter to protect the individual against manipulation. This can be seen in the fact that it was primarily young people who revolted against communism in Hungary in 1956—presumably those who had been fed the party line and were not familiar with the more democratic days prior to the invasion of Hitler and the subsequent establishment of a Soviet-dominated government. The elder Hungarians, whose early education had not been manipulated to the same extent, tended to sit on the sidelines and to accept the party position. Evidence suggesting the tendency of those who are provided with a single viewpoint to protect themselves against what are perceived as propagandistic messages is found in various social-psychological experiments involving such things as efforts to get military recruits to practice better dental hygiene. Respondents who are given two views of the subject tend to accept the message more readily than those who are presented with only one side of the issue and consequently feel manipulated.

68. William Lederer, *A Nation of Sheep* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961).

Political elites may attempt to manipulate public opinion for both domestic and international purposes. Just as political decision makers have been known to use external conflict to divert attention from internal problems, they have sought to demonstrate their peacemaking capabilities in the international arena in order to bolster sagging public support. Both Presidents Nixon and Carter actively sought to play a peacemaking role while in office. The former sought to counter his deteriorating position at the time of Watergate by attempting to negotiate a SALT II agreement and to hold a summit conference with the Soviet Union in 1974. Many have speculated that Carter gambled on success in negotiations with Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat at Camp David in September 1978 as a way of improving his standing with the public, which was lower than that of any President since Harry S. Truman. Indeed, Carter's successes at Camp David raised his popularity rating some 13 percent. It has also been asserted that Chancellor Willy Brandt of the Federal Republic of Germany activated his *Ost-Politik* policy, calling for better relations with Soviet bloc states, in the late 1960s because of his declining popularity within West Germany. Since Brandt's Socialist party was in coalition with the Free Democratic party, it was impossible to press a domestic success, for there were too many philosophical differences between the two parties on domestic issues. Leaders of developing countries also tend to exert considerable energy on foreign-policy issues, as in the case of the late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India. Domestic problems in such countries have often seemed so intractable that the leadership, perhaps in the desire to feel that it is at least doing something useful, tends to become preoccupied with foreign-policy issues.

Decision makers also attempt to influence public opinion in order to improve their bargaining position in the international arena. Demonstrating that the public is behind them on a given policy and suggesting that the state has no other options given the pressure of public opinion can be a useful strategy in international bargaining. Franklin D. Roosevelt used this strategem so much that Stalin began to rationalize his own foreign-policy positions on the basis that a given move that he opposed would be unacceptable to the Soviet public. As the SALT II negotiations entered their final phase, the Carter administration sought to take advantage of the Senate's hostility toward a SALT agreement as

a way of inducing the Soviets to be more conciliatory in the negotiations.

One of the most striking examples of the use of public opinion for diplomatic ends occurred in October 1975, when more than one hundred thousand protesting Moroccans marched into Spanish Sahara to demonstrate support for Moroccan territorial claims against Algeria. The case illustrates how governmental propaganda can be utilized to rally public opinion to demonstrate against unpopular international moves. The use of such mass demonstrations has been a fairly common practice, particularly in countries with authoritarian and personalist regimes.

4. Efforts to manipulate public opinion may backfire.

In attempting to manipulate public opinion to support a given policy, whether for internal or external objectives, decision makers need to be aware of latent predispositions that exist within a target population; otherwise, their efforts to mobilize public opinion might be counterproductive. Two cases in which the United States sought to educate the American public on foreign-policy issues demonstrate this point very well. These consist of governmental efforts to generate support for freer trade in the 1950s and to increase public support for foreign aid in 1961.[69]

In both instances what might be called the "iceberg effect" resulted from the official educational efforts to sell a more liberal policy on the issue. Visualize if you will an iceberg, of which only a small portion exists above the water level. This portion might represent the informed public, whereas the much larger portion that is submerged could reflect the uninformed mass public. The informed public was found to be better educated and more liberal on the issues of foreign aid and trade, as is generally true of better-educated people. When the public campaign to lower the water level of ignorance began to show some success, the larger public, represented by previously submerged portions of the iceberg, brought with it a group whose latent attitudes were hostile to a more liberal policy on trade and aid. Consequently, the administration only increased the amount of antagonism

69. Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1963); James N. Rosenau, *National Leadership and Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the Mobilization of Support* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).

toward the policies it was trying to persuade the public to accept. In 1978 the Carter administration risked similar negative responses in attempting to generate mass public support for the Panama Canal Treaties, as such publicity made the issue salient to a broader public whose latent predisposition was to oppose any such action, which was viewed as a policy of weakness. Of course, if one's adversaries make a major point of an issue, an administration may have little choice but to engage in a counterattack in support of its position.

5. Public opinion will be effective only if it is organized, but even then foreign-policy pressure groups tend to be less effective than vested-interest groups that attempt to affect domestic policy.

Perhaps the greatest deficiency of the foreign-policy pressure group lies in the fact that it has greater difficulty in making credible and legitimate claims on foreign-policy matters than a pressure group does in making such claims on domestic matters. Decision makers tend to question the legitimacy of a group's claims on generalized foreign-policy issues, since its stake in such an issue is no greater than that of any other group of citizens. A special expertise or vested interest needs to be demonstrated in order for such a pressure group to have much influence. Thus, it is somewhat easier for the National Farm Organization to have an impact on farm legislation than it is for the United States Association for the United Nations to influence the United States' policy at the United Nations.

6. Public opinion, or at least the decision makers' perception of that opinion, places certain constraints on the making of foreign policy.

Research seems to indicate that the decision makers in a democratic society generally operate on the basis of what they perceive to be the public will. The historian Ernest R. May has noted that one can almost count on one's fingers the number of occasions when American statesmen made major decisions that they thought contrary to the public will.[70] Franklin D. Roosevelt felt constrained in taking the United States into World War II, given the strong antiwar sentiment at the time; American decision makers were also reluctant to recognize the

70. Cited in Levering, *The Public and American Foreign Policy*, p. 152.

People's Republic of China, since a lobby group, the Committee of One Million, had made it appear that such a move would be unacceptable to the public; and according to Daniel Ellsberg, the insistence of American decision makers on remaining in Vietnam even after they recognized that the effort was futile was largely due to their belief that the American public would not tolerate a defeat in war and that such an event might mean certain electoral defeat.[71]

In order to generate support for a policy, decision makers find it necessary to oversimplify issues and to express complex issues in simple slogans. In turn, this tends to become a millstone around the necks of the decision makers, sometimes impeding flexible foreign policy. Decision makers who have made a career out of anticommunist statements, for example, are going to find it difficult to shift gears and press for detente when circumstances suggest the desirability of such a change.

That democratic decision makers have felt constrained by public opinion from time to time cannot be doubted, but there has also been a tendency to believe one's own state to be constrained more than another state. Thus, a French academic once complained at a conference in London that although the British exercised effective freedom in foreign policy, the French government had to pay more attention to public opinion.[72]

7. Public opinion generally does not incite a nation to war.

There has been some concern that public moods, perhaps fired by the mass media, may induce a state to go to war or behave in a bellicose fashion. This was alleged to have been the case in 1898, when the United States declared war on Spain despite the fact that the latter had acceded to all of its demands. The Hearst newspapers in particular were accused of practicing yellow journalism in an effort to fuel emotional support for war with Spain. A study of the relationship of public opinion to the outbreak of war in the United States and Britain, however, suggested that such incitement has not usually been the case. Public opinion seemed to follow policy changes with respect to more militant postures rather than preceding such changes.[73]

71. Daniel Ellsberg, *Papers on the War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. 122.

72. Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain*, p. 271.

73. Joel T. Campbell and Leila S. Cain, "Public Opinion and the Outbreak of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 9 (September 1965), 318–28.

8. Public opinion on foreign-policy issues plays a minor role in electoral politics.

If public opinion is to have an impact on foreign policy, it would seem that its effect would be felt most emphatically around election time as candidates and governments seek to be more responsive to public needs and desires. The fact of the matter is that in most countries that hold democratic elections, foreign policy has not been much of an issue, or at any rate the positions of the candidates have not been clear enough to turn an election into a referendum on a foreign-policy issue. Even the 1968 presidential election in the United States did not become a referendum on Vietnam, despite the high salience of the issue at the time. This was due primarily to the fact that the two contenders for the presidency, Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey, were not perceived as taking radically different positions on the issue. Indeed, this appears to be a general pattern in American electoral campaigns, in which there is a tendency to blur differences on foreign-policy positions. In contrast, struggles for power in the Soviet Union have tended to accentuate such differences.[74]

Foreign-policy issues tend to be of even less significance in the political campaigns of other democratic states. Dorothy Pickles, for example, has suggested that it is commonplace that French elections are never won on foreign-policy issues.[75] Michael Brecher noted that even for a state like Israel, where national security is the foremost issue, foreign-policy issues dominated only two of five elections through 1965.[76] He concluded that there is no evidence to suggest that Israeli elections have influenced either the strategy of foreign policy making or its implementation. Similarly, decision makers in Japan have paid little attention to public opinion on foreign-policy issues, primarily because the Liberal Democratic party, with its vastly superior numbers, has dominated the decision-making process most of the time since 1951. Major foreign-policy controversies such as the Japanese–American Security Treaty in 1960 and the Okinawa reversion issue had a minimal impact on electoral outcomes. According to Chae-Jin Lee,

74. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1964), p. 193.

75. Dorothy Pickles, "French Foreign Policy," in F. S. Northedge, ed., *The Foreign Policies of the Powers* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 189.

76. Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 125.

personality and party have been more important than the issues in recent Japanese elections.[77]

Part of the reason that public opinion tends to become less activated on foreign-policy issues than on domestic issues may be the fact that foreign policy has a less immediate and visible effect on the electorate. Supporting a disarmament agreement or negotiating a human rights document can be viewed as a relatively safe action for a decision maker, for it often takes time for any adverse effects to show themselves, whereas decisions related to domestic allocations of resources or actions designed to affect employment or inflation are likely to be more immediately felt. Moreover, there may be a general feeling on the part of the public that it lacks appropriate information on which to base a judgment. Information is more closely controlled on foreign-policy matters, given its sensitive nature; as a result, there is greater willingness to defer to those who are closer to the situation.

As international decisions come increasingly to be perceived as affecting domestic well-being, one can expect an intensified effort on the part of the public to become more involved. The implications of the 1972 grain deal with the Soviet Union, which substantially increased wheat prices for the American consumer, as well as the OPEC oil boycott of 1973–74, demonstrated how a nation's well-being is affected by foreign-policy decisions.

THE DECISIONAL CONTEXT

Although it is possible to develop certain generalizations regarding the role played by various actors (bureaucrats, legislators, the public) in the decision-making process, it is still necessary to explore the specific circumstances surrounding a given decision in order to comprehend why certain choices are made. The most extensively researched of these contextual factors is the existence or nonexistence of crises, which can affect decision making in several ways. In the first instance, crises tend to provide decision makers with greater decisional latitude. Political leaders can generally anticipate that the public will support them during periods of crisis as the nation rallies around the flag. As has been pointed out, crises like the Cuban missile crisis and the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran added several

77. Chae-Jin Lee, *Japan Faces China*, p. 11.

points to the President's popularity. Even failures like the Bay of Pigs and the abortive attempt to free the American hostages from Iran in April 1980 had the immediate effect of increasing presidential popularity.

During periods of crisis the decision-making group is generally smaller, as only the central decision maker and his or her top associates become involved. This is so not only because of the need to make rapid decisions, but also because of concern about secrecy as a plan is developed. Such constraints would seem to lessen the impact of the bureaucracy on the making of foreign policy, providing support for the rational-actor model. It has been suggested that decisions made during crises are more likely to be in accord with the broader national interest than those made during more placid times. Decisions made in the context of a crisis are less likely to be watered down through bureaucratic compromise, and the decision makers themselves may be less concerned with the sometimes uninformed and selfish demands of the mass public and special interests. On the other hand, Steven Krasner argues that because of the time constraints that prevail at such a time, central decision makers must rely on the expertise, predetermined preferences, and contingency plans already developed by the bureaucracy.[78]

Because of the limited time available and the psychological stress inherent in a crisis situation, there will be less searching for alternatives. During an emergency one can anticipate that decision makers will grasp the first historical analogy that comes to mind and then proceed to collect information to support it. Crises also tend to lead to rigid and stereotypic thinking, which has serious negative implications for rational foreign-policy choice.

Communication difficulties both within the nation and between nations are more likely to occur during crisis periods. Since crises produce a sense of national emergency, one is likely to find greater concern about secrecy in the decision-making process. Agencies of government, even if they have adequate time to communicate during the crisis, fail to do so for fear that such communications might be intercepted. Consequently, important events are not anticipated, as in the case of Pearl Harbor, and inappropriate responses based on incomplete information will result.

78. Steven D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important," *Foreign Policy*, 7 (Summer 1972), 176.

Communication failures during crises are even more likely to occur when inter-state communication is involved. A serious difficulty is created by the problem of information overload as decision makers become exercised about an issue. Separating out the most salient messages coming from several sources may be especially difficult. Communication is also impeded by the determined efforts of the adversary to mislead its opposition. Poor communication also results from the perceptual difficulties confronting individual decision makers during periods of stress, as discussed in Chapter 2. Because of these communication problems and others like them, one study of sixteen international crises found that the chances of a message getting through untarnished to someone in the receiving government were only about four in ten.[79]

Periods of persistent crisis like the cold war have serious implications for foreign policy. Chief among these is the likelihood that recurrent crises may dull one's reactions to danger. As people live with tension for long periods, they are less likely to be vigilant when new and dangerous situations arise. Crises may present a particular problem if recent history has involved a number of false alarms. This seems to have been the case with respect to the Western failure to anticipate the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. Several previous border incidents had led those involved to miscalculate and underestimate the massive strike from the north.

Whether recurrent crises tend to increase or decrease the probability of war has been assessed differently by two distinguished scholars. Quincy Wright has suggested that the probability of war is a function of the additive effect of the probability of war erupting in a series of crises.[80] The inevitable result of such a formulation is that sooner or later a 100-percent probability of war is reached. Charles A. McClelland, on the other hand, explicitly rejects this formulation, arguing that states learn how to routinize their behavior in conflict situations.[81] Having learned how to deescalate one crisis, they can apply what they have learned to another situation involving the same state. It may be,

79. Glenn H. Snyder, *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 316.

80. Wright, *A Study of War*, p. 1272.

81. Charles A. McClelland, "The Acute International Crisis," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System: Theoretical Essays* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 182–204.

however, that when a state has gone to the brink several times, it will become less cautious and go beyond the point of no return.

The size and range of the foreign-policy agenda provides a second major set of illustrations of how contextual factors can affect foreign-policy choices. The number of issues clamoring for attention determine the time that can be spent on each issue by top-level decision makers. This may mean in some instances that certain issues will not reach the decisional stage regardless of how important they might seem, or that they will be decided at lower decisional levels, either of which can make a difference in the choices that are made.

Decision makers are sensitive about becoming involved in too many crises at one time, particularly if this might result in a two-front war. The differing responses of the United States government to the North Korean seizure of the *Pueblo* in 1968 and to the Iranian hostage situation in 1979–81 are most instructive on this point. The Iranian seizure became a nightly news item in the United States, and President Carter, on the pretext of having to stay in Washington to deal with the crisis, did not venture out of the city for several months. On the other hand, the United States government, as well as the public, seemed almost to forget about the naval personnel who were imprisoned in North Korea for a period of more than a year. A major difference between the two situations that might help explain the different reactions was that the United States was involved in Vietnam at the time of the *Pueblo* incident and was therefore concerned about the danger of creating a two-front war if it were to take strong action against North Korea. Similar concerns preoccupied German decision makers in both World Wars as they sought, at least initially, to move against one group of states while neutralizing the other.

It is necessary in effective decision making to develop priorities rather than attempt to deal with many issues simultaneously. Only great powers can afford the luxury of an extensive foreign-policy agenda, and even they may run into difficulties if the agenda is too full. Part of Kaiser Wilhelm's problem around the time of World War I arose from the fact that he was seeking too many foreign-policy objectives concurrently and, as a result, was making too many enemies.[82] Certain objectives would have to be relinquished or deferred for the kaiser to

82. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 140.

gain a sufficient number of allies to aid him in achieving his most important goals.

How simultaneous events can affect foreign-policy choices can also be seen in United States policy toward Taiwan. It is quite probable that the Carter administration would have moved more rapidly toward recognition of the People's Republic of China but for the fact that efforts to obtain ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties in 1977 had already alienated a significant number of Americans. To have introduced another policy to which a large portion of the population would be opposed would only have produced further domestic division. Hence the administration waited two years before recognizing the People's Republic of China and simultaneously rejecting American defense commitments to Taiwan.

The kinds of issues found on a state's foreign-policy agenda will make a difference in terms of which domestic groups are able and willing to assume a more active foreign-policy role. Britain's successive economic crises have tended to strengthen the role of Treasury in the British decision-making process. In many other states the increasing salience of international economic issues is providing a more significant role for economic ministries, as noted previously. Similarly, continuing military crises will result in the military's playing a more prominent role, and military options will receive more serious consideration than they might otherwise have obtained.

Although other contextual factors that are relevant to decision making might be noted, the critical factor is how the decision makers themselves define a given situation. Do they see it as a crisis that threatens their basic values, or is it viewed as an issue that does not require immediate attention? There are obviously hundreds of events occurring throughout the world that might suggest the need for some sort of response. For all but the superpowers, most of these events will be seen as quite irrelevant. Moreover, within the decision-making unit some people may view a given issue as important while others may not. This in turn will affect both who decides and what action, if any, is taken.

CONCLUSION

Evidence has been presented in this chapter to suggest that the structure of the decision-making process and who makes the decisions can make a difference in foreign policy. A major debate surrounds the question of whether authoritarian or democratic structures are superior in the making of foreign policy. In terms of effectiveness and efficiency, there are reasons to support the primacy of authoritarian regimes, for such governments ought to be able to make decisions more rapidly, ensure domestic compliance with their decisions, and perhaps be more consistent in their foreign policy. Yet such ideals have not always been realized, and authoritarian regimes often are less effective in developing an innovative foreign policy because of subordinates' pervasive fear of raising questions. Although authoritarian governments appear to have certain advantages in diplomatic negotiations, the evidence is divided on the question of which type of regime is likely to pursue more peaceful policies.

How power is distributed in the decision-making structure was also seen to make some difference. Generally speaking, central governments and the executive branches dominate foreign policy in both authoritarian and democratic governments. Legislatures do little more than ratify executive decisions; despite efforts to redress the balance, as in the case of the 1973 War Powers Act, the executive remains dominant.

More interesting in terms of explaining foreign policy are the relative roles of central decision makers and bureaucrats. Despite some very persuasive arguments in support of the bureaucratic politics model, which sees a key role for bureaucrats at both the formulation and implementation stages, the central decision makers determine who their key advisers will be and which advice to heed. Given the importance of national security issues and control over the instruments of coercion, the military is one bureaucratic group that can have a significant impact on foreign policy. However, divisions among the military, along with tradition, and the sharing of common values with the broader society, have operated to restrain the military from dominating the decision-making process.

Political parties, interest groups, and particularly the mass public appear to have the least impact on foreign-policy choices. Since the latter is so easily manipulated, its importance as a determinant of foreign policy is highly limited even in democratic polities. At the same time, we know that democratically elected leaders often seem to have their eyes on the popularity polls when certain foreign-policy decisions are being made. The evidence does suggest, however, that there is little reason to fear an uninformed and emotional public interfering with rational foreign-policy calculation by forcing ill-conceived policies on reluctant decision makers.